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Beyond Lawrence: Metaprivacy and Punishment
ABSTRACT. Lawrence v. Texas remains, after three years of precedential life, an opinion in
search of a principle. It is both libertarian- Randy Barnett has called it the constitutionalization
ofJohn Stuart Mill's On Liberty-and communitarian-William Eskridge has described it as the
gay rights movement's Brown v. Board ofEducation.It is simultaneously broad, in its evocation of
our deepest spiritual commitments, and narrow, in its self-conscious attempts to avoid
condemning laws against same-sex marriage, prostitution, and bestiality. This Article reconciles
these competing claims on Lawrence's jurisprudential legacy. In Part I, it defends the view that
Lawrence constitutionalizes what I call "metaprivacy": When societal consensus internalizes a
breach of the historical legal divide between particular "conduct" and an associated "status,"
punishment of that conduct cannot be based on moral approbation alone. The Article then, in
Part II, harmonizes this view of Lawrence's legacy with pre-Lawrence constitutional privacy
doctrine and theory. Finally, in Part III, the Article applies this understanding of Lawrence
interdoctrinally, to capital sentencing. The Article suggests that all that separates the
impermissible moral judgments made by a legislature in prohibiting sodomy from the
permissible indeed, almost constitutionally required-moral judgments made during the
sentencing phase of a capital trial is a preference for gays over other a priori criminals.
Notwithstanding the obvious appeal of permitting such a preference, Lawrence provides no
support for it.

AUTHOR. Law Clerk, Hon. Guido Calabresi, U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Second Circuit;
J.D., Yale Law School, 2005; A.B., Harvard College, 1999. I wish to thank Ursula Bentele,
Manuel Berrdlez, Guido Calabresi, John Coyle, William Eskridge, Zachary Katz, Jon Michaels,
Elora Mukherjee, Jennifer Peresie, Laurence Schwartztol, and especially Daniel Markovits for
their generous feedback and support. I owe a special debt to Brenda Greene, Perry Greene, and
Talib Greene for their still more generous example.
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[Pjrivacyis nothing less than society's limitingprinciple.'

INTRODUCTION

Can the state kill someone for being a bad person? Consider the following
Connecticut case: In 1997, Todd Rizzo, then eighteen years old and already an
ex-Marine, invited thirteen-year-old Stanley Edwards into his backyard, telling
him that they would be hunting snakes. Once there, Rizzo straddled Edwards,
in Rizzo's words, "like a horse," and struck him thirteen times with a
sledgehammer as the boy pleaded for his life. He dumped the dead body in the
woods nearby. Rizzo's motive? While stationed in Hawaii less than a year
before the murder, the members of Rizzo's platoon had been asked to list their
ten goals in life. The second goal on Rizzo's list was "to kill a man." An avid
student of past serial killings, Rizzo told police after he was taken into custody
that he had bludgeoned Edwards to death because he wanted to see what it felt
like. He pleaded guilty to capital murder and was sentenced to death in August
1999.,

I suspect that many Americans, regardless of their moral or legal stance on
capital punishment, would at least deny any inconsistency in believing both
that the state may execute people like Todd Rizzo, and that it may not kill
someone for being a bad person. It is not a difficult moral position to make
out: Individuals are sentenced to death because they are convicted of
committing heinous crimes, not because they are bad people, though the
former may be strong evidence of the latter. The premise of this position is
more complicated, however, than I have presented it. While being convicted of
a heinous crime is a necessary precondition of a capital sentence, it is not a
sufficient one. Many convicted of murder are not sentenced to death, and not
only because of the capricious nature of sentencing juries or the serendipity of a
plea bargain. In Woodson v. North Carolina,the Supreme Court found within
the Eighth Amendment the notion that some convicts are more death-worthy
than others. 3 As such, no capital sentence since Woodson may be imposed
without considering, in some fashion,4 those factors that aggravate and

1.

2.

H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW S 15-1, at 1302 (2d ed. 1988).
State v. Rizzo, 833 A.2d 363 (Conn. 2003). Rizzo was discharged from the Marines after
failing a drug test. See Trish Willingham, Letter Shows Cold, Calculating Killer, HARTFORD
LAURENCE

COURANT, June 16, 1999, at A12.
3.

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 28o (1976).

4.

State schemes for considering aggravating and mitigating factors may be divided into two
types. Under "weighing" schemes, aggravators and mitigators are balanced against each
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mitigate an individual's death-worthiness. Among the aggravating factors that
were a but-for cause of Todd Rizzo's capital sentence were his "long-standing
fascination with violent death and serial killers; his preexisting desire to kill;
and the callous way in which he disposed of the victim's body."' Rizzo, then,
was not sentenced to death because he was found guilty of a heinous murder that only explains his detention. He was sentenced to death because he had
what Immanuel Kant called "inner wickedness." 6 He would be a prime
a number of psychiatrists have been
candidate for a diagnostic label for which
7
agitating in recent years: clinically "evil."
For most of America's constitutional history, the distinction between
detention for conduct and detention for constitutive character has not been
legally relevant. That American courts did not, by and large, scrutinize
punishments for unconstitutional excess before the mid-twentieth century
provides a partial explanation," but the more important one is that we have
viewed punishment for "inner wickedness" with skepticism during only a brief
and recent epoch in our constitutional life. The homosexuality cases are
paradigmatic. As late as 1986, the Court was "quite unwilling," in Bowers v.
Hardwick, to "announce . . .a fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy."9 Homosexual sex acts could be criminalized because the Court
refused to acquiesce in the view that "majority sentiments about the morality of
homosexuality should be declared inadequate."" The past decade, however,
has brought us Romer v. Evans, in which the Court declared that a Colorado
constitutional amendment prohibiting the enactment of gay-friendly

other. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2005). Under "threshold" schemes, jurors
have the option of a death sentence so long as a given number of aggravators is present, but
they are told that they must consider mitigating evidence. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. S 16-320 (2004).
5.

Rizzo, 833 A.2d at 382.

6.

IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS io6 (Mary Gregor ed., 1996) (1797).

7.

See Benedict Carey, Forthe Worst of Us, the Diagnosis May Be 'Evil', N.Y. TiMES,Feb. 8, 2005,
at F1.
See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (holding, for the first time, a punishment
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment). The Supreme Court did not hold that the
Eighth Amendment was incorporated against the states until 1962. See Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 66o (1962); see also Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,
462 (1947) (assuming, without deciding, that a state's violation of Eighth Amendment
principles would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Weems
case involved a punishment administered in the Philippines, which was then under the
control of the federal government. See infra text accompanying notes 295-298.

8.

9. 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

io. Id.at 196.
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antidiscrimination laws violated the Equal Protection Clause,11 and Lawrence v.
Texas, which affirmed the right of adults to engage in consensual homosexual
relations in the privacy of their homes. 2 Whatever its enduring contours,
Lawrence seems at least to turn a suspicious eye toward arguments against
conduct grounded in the subjective moral illegitimacy- rather than the
objective social effects - of that conduct.
This Article develops this reading of Lawrence and, focusing particularly on
capital sentences, considers the extent to which the logic of Lawrence compels
an inquiry into the constitutionality of incremental punishment based on
character. On Justice Kennedy's terms, Lawrence stands for the proposition that
the state may not punish the conduct that "define[s]" an individual as
homosexual,13 but need not endorse a homosexual lifestyle as legitimate, nor
afford gay persons the same protection against invidious discrimination
granted to those identified by race or sex. Writing this time for an outright
majority, Justice Kennedy reaffirmed in Lawrence an opaque and controversial
statement made by the plurality in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, that the Court's
"obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate [its] own moral
code.' 4 Without making any judgments about the rightness or wrongness of
Lawrence's reasoning or holding, this Article scrutinizes what follows from
taking Justice Kennedy at his word. I conclude that, subject to the inevitable
retroactive tinkering of the common law,'" the character-based retributive
rationale for capital punishment that the doctrine presently employs does not
survive scrutiny under Lawrence because it is not character-neutral. That is, it
depends intimately and therefore impermissibly on judgments about the
punishment-worthiness of an individual's defining moral characteristics.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I scrutinizes Lawrence itself in an effort
to identify a nonarbitrary principle that justifies its result. Unless the holding is
sui generis, Lawrence may be justified by one of at least two broad, competing
rationalizations. The first is the one Justice Scalia suggests in dissent, namely
that the state may not criminalize "morals" offenses, such as incest or public
nudity. 6 This rationale, grounded as it is in an overtly libertarian live-and-letlive ethic, would read into the Constitution some form of John Stuart Mill's
"harm principle," the notion that an individual has an absolute right to

11.

517 U.S. 620 (1996).

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
13. See id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
14. Id. at 571 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 850).
12.

is.

See infra text accompanying notes 351-352.

dissenting).
16. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J.,
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perform either self-regarding acts or consensual acts affecting others.17 Section
L.A rejects this view of Lawrence, and Section I.B argues for a second, more
narrow, rationale for its holding -the proposition that conduct agreed by social
consensus to be "status-definitional" cannot be punished for morality's sake.
Punishment, that is, may be moral, but it must be impersonal. I term the right
to remain free of government interference with one's transcendent identity a
right to "metaprivacy."
Part II attempts to harmonize my reading of Lawrence with the existing
doctrinal and theoretical landscape. Section II.A traces the evolution of
metaprivacy within the tort privacy, Fourth Amendment privacy, and
fundamental-decision privacy cases. Section II.B situates metaprivacy within
the academic literature on privacy. I ultimately argue that refusing to read into
the doctrine a distinction between homosexual conduct and certain other forms
of a priori criminal conduct is consistent with a gradual shift in our
understanding of liberty toward a government of presumptively limited
powers.
Part III connects Lawrence's conception of metaprivacy to the particular
form of retributive punishment countenanced by present capital punishment
doctrine. Section III.A explains, in doctrinal terms, the elusive concept of
retribution and argues that retributive punishment in action involves
impermissible judgments about the content of the condemned's constitutive
commitments, and is therefore susceptible to attack under the principles of
Lawrence-style metaprivacy. Section III.B responds to some anticipated
objections to extending metaprivacy principles into the capital sentencing
thicket. The Article ultimately theorizes Lawrence's most defensible working
principle, then hypothesizes an end point for that principle that lies beyond the
bedroom walls. It will be for present and future courts and polities to
determine whether this is heartening or dangerous territory.
I.

LAWRENCE

V. TEXAS AND METAPRIVACY

In September 1998, officers of the Harris County Police Department
entered a private residence in the Houston area to investigate a report of an
armed intruder breaking into a home." Upon entering the home, the officers
witnessed John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner engaged in anal sex. The

17. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 139 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2003)

(1859).

18.

See RtA. Dyer, Two Men Charged Under State's Sodomy Law, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 6,
1998, at Al. The report turned out to be false. See id.

Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal

1867

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

115:1862

2oo6

two men were arrested, charged, and convicted of violating section 21.o6(a) of
the Texas Penal Code, which prohibited "deviate sexual intercourse" with
someone of the same sex.' 9 The case on appeal concerned the constitutionality
of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment. Lawrence's incontrovertible
result was that Texas's prohibition on same-sex sodomy violated the Due
Process Clause, and that Bowers v. Hardwick was wrong, both in methodology
and in outcome, the day it was decided.2
Lawrence is otherwise famously obtuse. An extraordinary number of
commentators have weighed in on its holding and we must, as always, look
forward to future cases to vindicate this account Or that one. But a lawyer's job
is to harmonize evidence, and Lawrence leaves many clues as to its holding,
clues that provide substantial fodder for discourse even at this relatively early
stage in its precedential life. This Part defends one reading of Lawrence, namely
that the case raises a bar to morals-based regulation of conduct recognized by
social consensus as status-defining. Along the way, I demonstrate how this
reading is related to but distinct from three alternative views: first, that the
case instantiates a broad form of John Stuart Mill's harm principle; second,
that it is fundamentally a case about desuetude; and third, that it forms a part
of what William Eskridge has described as a "jurisprudence of tolerance."2 1
A. Lawrence as On Liberty
Reading into Lawrence John Stuart Mill's harm principle -the idea that
"the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others"-is tantalizing, and Justice Kennedy does not do enough to
discourage it. Lawrence does not, after all, call itself a "privacy" case, speaking
instead in terms of "liberty," a concept far closer to Mill's heart. The opinion
mentions the right of "privacy" only in stating the questions presented for
certiorari and in recapping the Court's holding in Griswold v. Connecticut, 3

19.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.o6(a) (Vernon 2003), invalidatedby Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. The

Texas Penal Code defined "deviate sexual intercourse" as "any contact between any part of
the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person" or "the penetration of
the genitals or the anus of another person with an object." Id. § 21.01(4).
2o. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-78.

22.

William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence'sJurisprudenceof Tolerance:Judicial Review To Lower the
Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1021, 1025 (2004).
MiLL, supra note 17, at 8o.

23.

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-65 (discussing 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).

21.

I868
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whereas it mentions "liberty" upwards of twenty-five times.
makes its emphasis clear from the opening paragraph:

4

The opinion

Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions
into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not
omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant
presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression,
and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the
person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.2"
This passage could be the prologue to Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,
and it is far from the opinion's only grist for the libertarian mill. Justice
Kennedy wrote that the Court's ruling, "as a general rule, should counsel
against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the
relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an
institution the law protects.''26 In attempting to define, as it had to, what was
meant by "injury,"2 7 the Court made clear that morals offenses would not
suffice. Justice Kennedy wrote explicitly that Justice Stevens's Bowers dissent,
in particular the hardly obvious assertion that "'the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is
not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice,'' 8
controlled the analysis in Lawrence. Finally, the six-Justice majority reaffirmed
the statement made by a three-judge plurality in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
that the Court's "'obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our
own moral code."'' 9 This view carries strong echoes of the neo-Millian
philosophy of H.L.A. Hart, who believed that even prostitution could not be
regulated so long as it occurred outside of public view.3

24.

25.

See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's LibertarianRevolution: Lawrence v. Texas, in CATO
SuP. CT. REV., 2OO2-2oo3, at 21, 34 (James L. Swanson ed., 2003).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.

a6. Id. at 567.
27. Mill never defined "harm" with any satisfaction. Living as we do within social space,
virtually every action we take intrudes in some way upon the interests of others. See infra
note 19o and accompanying text.
z8. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
29. Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 85o (1992)).
30. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LiBERTYANDMORALITY 13 (1963).
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While some commentators have taken the "harm principle" bait,31 others
have kept the wax of constitutional pragmatism firmly in their ears. 2 Perhaps
the best evidence that Justice Kennedy's principle is neither Mill's nor Hart's is
that he more or less tells us as much. He explains in dicta that the case "does
not involve... prostitution," implying thereby that it would be a different case
if it did.3" Although one can imagine theoretical grounds for distinguishing
anti-prostitution from anti-sodomy laws - based, for example, on implied
coercion, or regulation of commerce -these distinctions are impeachable. Not
all commercial sex exchanges are coercive, and refusing to allow individuals to
engage in a particular form of commerce because it is viewed as immoral runs
only slightly less directly afoul of a Millian reading of Lawrence than the Texas
anti-sodomy regulation. Moreover, Justice Kennedy conspicuously segregated
his mention of prostitution from his earlier mention of "persons who might be
injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might
not easily be refused." 34 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that antiprostitution laws still survive scrutiny not on some consent-based theory but
because prostitution is traditionally viewed as immoral.
Similarly, Justice Kennedy in two places appeared determined to remove
same-sex marriage from the scope of Lawrence's holding. First, he exempted
from the case's purview, as mentioned above, "abuse of an institution the law
protects. 35 Second, he disclaimed having announced that "the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek
to enter.", 6 What beyond an explicitly moral judgment, Laurence Tribe has
asked, "could be the rationale for permitting an otherwise eligible same-sex
couple to enjoy the tangible benefits and assume the legal obligations of some
version of civil union but withholding from them that final measure of
respect-that whole that plainly exceeds the mere sum of its component legal

31.

See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 24, at 21; Richard A. Epstein, Of Same Sex Relationships and
Affirmative Action: The Covert Libertarianismof the United States Supreme Court, 12 SuP. CT.
ECON. REV. 75 (2004); Paul M. Secunda, Lawrence's QuintessentialMillian Moment and Its
Impact on the Doctrineof UnconstitutionalConditions, 50 VILL. L. REv.

32.

117

(2ooS).

See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?,88 MINN. L. REV. 1140 (2004); Miranda
Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence, and the InevitableNormativity
of Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1312 (2004). But see Randy E. Barnett,
Correspondence, GradingJustice Kennedy: A Reply to Professor Carpenter, 89 MINN. L. REV.
1582 (2005).

33.

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.

34.

Id. The second clause is an obvious reference to incest.
Id. at 567.

35.

36. Id. at 578.
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parts?""7 It is not for a court, in dicta, to limit the prospective scope of its
holdings' 8 But a court's attempts to do so speak directly to the principle it is
presumptively announcing, and Justice Kennedy's various proscriptions and
disclaimers do not seem consistent with a broad harm principle.
We can expand our examination of prospective applications beyond what is
express, and hypothesize responses to other morals legislation, including the
remainder of Justice Scalia's laundry list of state laws he believes threatened by
the majority's holding. Faced with his imagined challenges to laws against
bigamy, bestiality, and obscenity,39 or, say, drug use, kidney sales, suicide, or
slave wages, 40 among others, an approach that identifies Mill's harm principle
as the prophylactic against state regulatory authority is hardly a model of
passive virtue. 41 Justice Kennedy wrote that "adults may choose to enter upon
[a homosexual] relationship in the confines of their homes and their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons,"4 2 and so perhaps the
correct limiting principle is that consensual conduct will be protected when it
occurs within the home. Such a principle does not seem well-tailored to the
text of the opinion, however, as it would appear to protect incest and
prostitution, and would be deeply inconsistent with the majority's apparently
self-conscious shift away from the word "privacy." "There are other spheres of

Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "FundamentalRight" That Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1893, 1946 (2004); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 6oi (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("'[P]reserving the traditional institution of marriage' is just a kinder way of
describing the State's moral disapproval of same-sex couples." (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
585 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment))).
38. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This case 'does not involve' the issue
of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have
nothing to do with the decisions of this Court." (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (majority
opinion))).
37.

39.

Id. at 590.

Randy Barnett has argued that Lawrence in fact opens the door to challenges to economic
regulation, and properly so. See Barnett, supra note z4, at 21. But see Carpenter, supra note
32, at 1152 ("A Court about to embark on a new and highly controversial adventure into
judicially mandated laissez-faire economics would at least drop a hint.").
41. As Justice White wrote in Bowers, "The law... is constantly based on notions of morality,
and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due
Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196
(1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also Ariela R. Dubler,
Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 YALE L.J. 756, 758-59 (2006)
("Despite the depth of Justice Scalia's ire, his dissent and Justice Kennedy's opinion for the
Court notably share a common commitment to maintaining a robust category of sexual
practices that can be legally prohibited; they simply disagree about whether or not same-sex
sodomy belongs in that category.").
42. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
40.
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our lives and existence, outside the home," the Court told us, "where the State
should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial
bounds." 4 Thus, while Lawrence's libertarian overtures are too brazen to be
countenanced fully, they are also too brazen to be ignored. The opinion clearly
meant to disfavor certain species of morals legislation. The trick is to figure out
what is so special about anti-sodomy laws.
B. Lawrence as Metaprivacy
The principle Lawrence announced is both bolder and more timid than a
simple harm principle. It does not reach the full panoply of morals regulation,
but failing to do so grants it the jurisprudential space to be arguably more
protective of particular facets of individual liberty than even Mill would allow.
In the eyes of the Lawrence majority, laws regulating the private sexual conduct
of homosexuals do not simply infringe on their right to privacy, the way a law
against viewing pornography in the home might, 44 or on their right to liberty,
the way a law against public nudity might. 4 Rather, the Court held that such
regulations effect a dignitary harm. Justice Kennedy used the word "demean"
in three places in the opinion. First, he wrote, "To say that the issue in Bowers
was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the
individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be
said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse." 46 Second,
he wrote that Bowers's very "continuance as precedent demeans the lives of
homosexual persons." 47 Finally, he wrote that "[t]he State cannot demean
[petitioners'] existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual
conduct a crime."48
The comparison to marriage should help illuminate how it is that defining
the right at issue in Bowers and Lawrence simply as a right to engage in sexual
intercourse is not just misleading but is in fact a dignitary insult. Justice
Kennedy's allusion to marriage referred directly to Griswold, in which the
Court struck down Connecticut's anti-birth-control laws. 49 In that case, Justice
Douglas wrote in sweeping terms for the majority that marriage "isan

43. Id. at 562.

44. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.s. 557 (1969).
45. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 6Ol (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 567 (majority opinion).
47-.Id. at 575.
48. Id. at 578.

49. 381 U.S. 479 (1965), cited in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-65.

1R-1
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association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.""0 Physical
intimacy in marriage is no mere vulgar satisfaction of prurient interests, but
rather stands in for a transcendent, merged identity. Marriage is a redefinition
of personhood, of which the freedom to engage in sexual intercourse -with or
without birth control-is but one element. Similarly, engaging in sexual
intercourse within a homosexual relationship is popularly perceived as not just
sex, but as a form of self-identification. 5 ' Thus it is that criminalization of
homosexual conduct both demeans the lives of homosexuals and controls their
destiny. The connection to Casey, which Justice Kennedy cited repeatedly, is
readily apparent, for outlawing abortion outright similarly threatens to control
an individual's destiny, that of the would-be mother. He wrote, quoting Casey,
that a homosexual person, as much as a heterosexual, "may seek autonomy" for
the purpose of"'defin[ing] the attributes of personhood"' by "'defin[ing] one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
52
human life.'
The crucial rhetorical move is the presumption that private sex acts are
elemental to the status-definition of gays. Justice Scalia made much in his
dissent in Romer v. Evans of the lack of a meaningful distinction between
homosexual "orientation" and homosexual "conduct." s3 So long as Bowers
remained good law, it was useful for someone urging the constitutionality of
laws disfavoring gays to collapse this distinction. Said Justice Scalia in Romer,
"[W]here criminal sanctions are not involved, homosexual 'orientation' is an
acceptable stand-in for homosexual conduct." 4 Lawrence said, in essence, that
when criminal sanctions are involved, the fact that homosexual conduct is a
stand-in for homosexual orientation means anti-sodomy laws must fail. It is
precisely because homosexual orientation may be defined by homosexual
conduct that a law disfavoring the conduct is, like Romer's Amendment 2, in
fact a law whose purpose is to disfavor a class of individuals. As Justice
Kennedy wrote, "When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the

so. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
51. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 ("When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct

with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring."); see also Tribe, supra note 37, at 19o5-o6 (arguing that even if the Texas law had
applied both to same-sex acts and to opposite-sex acts, the statute still would be struck
down because "sodomy" is pervasively and pejoratively associated with gays).
52.

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851

53.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640-42 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

(1992)).

54. Id. at 642.
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State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.""5 The
principle that we can draw from this statement is that when an individual's
status is defined by conduct, the state may not outlaw that conduct on moral
grounds. 6 To do so would interfere too intrusively in the life of the individual,
"sT
and violate her right to privacy "in its more transcendent dimensions.
The reading I urge helps to explain why Justice Kennedy did not specify
the level of scrutiny he is applying. On one hand, he wrote that Texas's antisodomy statute "furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.", 8 This
formulation implies that Justice Kennedy was employing rational basis review.
On the other hand, he made this statement immediately after quoting Casey's
mandate that "[i]t is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter." 9 Under our
constitutional tradition, the realm of personal liberty that the government may
not enter is not protected by mere rational basis review . 6 ' Rather, the state
must justify its entrance into such realms with a compelling interest, and it
must tailor its means narrowly to effectuate that interest. To suggest, as Justice
Kennedy did explicitly, that Lawrence follows from the Griswold line of cases is
to imply that strict scrutiny applies. 6' A third option, of course, is that Justice
Kennedy was employing strict scrutiny, but that he did not believe the statute
survived even rational basis review. The important point, though, is that once
we collapse the status-conduct distinction, it becomes unnecessary to specify a
particular standard of review. In the spirit of the Bill of Attainder clauses, to
make a particular class of individuals a target of the criminal law for no reason
other than disapproval of their very being is illegitimate as a matter of first

5S. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.

56.

Cf Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66o, 666 (1962) (striking down a statute for making
"the 'status' of narcotic addiction a criminal offense").

57.

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.

sS.

Id. at 578.

s9. Id. at 578 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847

(1992)).

60. See infra text accompanying notes 151-152 (discussing the doctrinal void formed by

weakening the level of scrutiny to apply to Fourth Amendment cases).
61.

See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and
Marriage,2003 Sup. CT. REv. 27, 48 ("The Court's assimilation of the Lawrence problem to

that in Griswold and its successors suggests that a fundamental right was involved."); Tribe,
supra note 37, at 1917 ("[T]he strictness of the Court's standard in Lawrence, however

articulated, could hardly have been more obvious.").
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principles. 62 Thus, on this view, even to reach a tiers-of-scrutiny analysis in
Lawrence demeans the lives of homosexual persons.
What is so special, then, about anti-sodomy laws is that they threaten not
the undifferentiated liberty to do what one wants, but the quite specific liberty
to be oneself. We now have an answer to the libertarian who extols the
opinion's scant references to "privacy." Lawrence does not concern what
Michael Sandel calls "old privacy"-"the interest in keeping intimate affairs
from public view" - but is far closer to what he calls "new privacy" - "the right
to make certain sorts of choices, free of interference by the state. '' 6 ' Given that
Lawrence happened to involve paradigmatic "old privacy" conduct, it would
have confused matters to write the opinion in the language of privacy rights.
I wish to be still more precise. Lawrence refines the set of choices that an
individual has a presumptive right to make to those that qualify in some
relevant way as status-defining. In a sense, then, the case marks a "Third
Reconstruction" in privacy jurisprudence. The right first discovered as "old
privacy" in the 189os was converted into a relatively unbounded "new privacy"
in the 196OS, 64 and now must navigate the more jurispathic landscape of
modern constitutional law. Accordingly (and with apologies to Derrida), I call
this newly transformed iteration a right to "metaprivacy," and define it as the
right to engage in status-definitional conduct free from normalizing
governmental interference.
1. On Desuetude
To this point, however, my argument remains vastly underspecified. I have
not yet nominated any particular catalyst for identification of conduct as statusdefinitional. Surely not all acts of self-definition are protected. Unless Lawrence
identifies a process for defining the relevant class, it has no answer to Justice
Scalia's criticism that a law against public nudity, for example, is suspect
because it "targets 'the conduct that is closely correlated with being a nudist,'
and hence 'is targeted at more than conduct'; it is 'directed toward nudists as a
class. ' ' 6, Miranda Oshige McGowan has illustrated the point by comparing

62.

See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Attainderand Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L.

REV.

(1996) (arguing that the Colorado amendment at issue in Romer could have been
invalidated under the logic of the Bill of Attainder Clauses).
203
63.

Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77
CAL. L. REv. 521, 526, 528 (1989).

64. See infra Section II.A.
65. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 6ol

(2003)

(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lawrence, 539

U.S. at 583 (majority opinion)).
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Lawrence to Barnes v. Glen Theatre, in which a Court plurality held that an
Indiana statute that required strippers to wear pasties and g-strings in adultonly clubs "'furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and
morality.' 66 Unless Lawrence overrules Barnes, it must explain, as McGowan
put it, "[w]hy... the liberties of nude dancers and strip club goers [don't]
count, and the liberties of gays do." 6 7 The answer McGowan settled on is that
"gays as a set are a group while the set of nude dancers and people who go to
strip clubs are not a group."68 She wrote that in distinguishing between simple
classifications and relevant groups, "the Court's practice is essentially

normative.

,69

This Article's project is to not give up quite so easily. I wish to take
seriously the Justices' contention that the distinctions drawn in Lawrence are
neither ad hoc judgments nor naked manifestations of their own moral codes.
The Court expended substantial ink on the idea that the crucial moving part in
defining the scope of the Due Process Clause is not the composition of the
Court but rather social convention. Justice Kennedy rejected the backwardlooking amateur historiography of the Bowers majority in favor of his own
sideways-looking amateur sociology. "In all events," he wrote, "we think that
our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here.
These references show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in
matters pertaining to sex."'7' The references Justice Kennedy cited included
changes in the Model Penal Code and state statutes, the decision of the
European Court of Human Rights in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,7' and,
perhaps most significantly, the fact that sodomy statutes had been
systematically unenforced. 2
Cass Sunstein, acknowledging the importance of this language in the
opinion, has concluded that Lawrence is an application of the common law
principle of desuetude. 73 The idea at play in Lawrence, Sunstein suggested, is
that "at least in some circumstances, involving certain kinds of human

66. McGowan, supra note 32, at 1326 (quoting 501 U.S. 560,569 (1991) (plurality opinion)).
67. Id. at 1329.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1334.
71.

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72 (emphasis added).
45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1981) (holding that Northern Ireland's anti-sodomy law
violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights).

72.

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73.

73.

See Sunstein, supra note 61, at 30.

70.
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interests, a criminal law cannot be enforced if it has lost public support. '7 4 The
justification for desuetude is that statutes that remain on the books but are not
generally enforced invite arbitrary, discriminatory, and undemocratic
prosecutions. 7' The individual interest at stake in Lawrence was thereby
converted from an interest in sexual autonomy to an interest in avoiding
victimization by arbitrary exercises of public power. This reading of Lawrence,
Sunstein noted, "mutes the apparent roots of Lawrence in substantive due
process. The idea of desuetude is, in a sense, a procedural one.", 6 Because the
Lawrence Court framed the issue as primarily one of "notice," it was not simply
responding to social fact, but "requiring[] an evolution in public opinionsomething like a broad consensus that the practice at issue should not be
punished."'7
Sunstein criticized the libertarian reading of Lawrence-what he called the
"simple autonomy reading" -for insufficiently taking account of the role social
consensus played in the opinion.78 But the desuetude reading might similarly
be criticized as insufficiently responsive to the remainder of the opinion.
Sunstein essentially conceded as much. Referring to the "narrow" version of
his thesis, that "the state may not rely on a justification [for a criminal statute]
that has lost public support," 9 Sunstein wrote that "[f]or it to operate, we
must have an antecedent way, to some extent independent of public
convictions, to determine whether an interest has some kind of constitutional
status. "8o Social consensus, that is, is not in itself sufficient to cabin Lawrence's
holding within workable limits. Neither, I argue, is the principle of statusdefinitional conduct. The best way to understand the roles of social consensus
and of status-definitional conduct, however, is in combination.

74. Id.
7S.

Id. at 50; see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 152 (1962) ("When
[an unenforced statute] is resurrected and enforced, it represents the ad hoc decision of the
prosecutor, and then of the judge and jury, unrelated to anything that may realistically be
taken as present legislative policy.").

76.

Sunstein, supra note 61, at 50.

77.

Id. at 49.

78.

Id.

79. Id. at 51.

8o. Id. Sunstein did not resolve this difficulty.
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On Recognizing Recognition

Social consensus plays a crucial role in delimiting the contours of the right
that the Court seeks to protect. It may operate in Lawrence- and presumably in
other privacy cases- in one of at least two ways. First, it may function literally
as Justice Kennedy suggested: An emerging awareness that a particular practice
forms part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause incorporates that
practice into the canon of fundamental freedoms. One is reminded here of
Justice Handy's views on the central role public opinion should play in the fate
of the Speluncean Explorers. 8' While this tautological approach to
constitutional decisionmaking is perfectly sensible for a legal realist like Justice
Handy, it will not satisfy the doctrinalist, ceaselessly concerned that "legislative
policy making... be distinguished from judicial rule applying. "8 The role of a
judge is to apply law, such as the Due Process Clause, to relevant facts, such as
the presence of a particular social consensus. Taken literally, this approach
would convert fact into law by allowing social consensus to supplant the judge
as decisionmaker.
Social consensus is not, however, incapable of playing a part in principled
constitutional decisionmaking. Consider the following alternative reading of
Justice Kennedy's concession to public conviction: The relevant social
consensus is not that homosexual sodomy is protected by the Due Process
Clause, but rather that homosexual sodomy is definitional -as opposed to
merely incidental -conduct for certain members of the political community. It
is true that reasonable people may differ as to whether "gay person" describes
an identity in precisely the same way as, say, "nudist" does, but Lawrence might
plausibly be read as a judicial announcement of public recognition of the
former identity but not the latter. Nudism, that is, is not (yet?) recognized as
an attribute of personhood. Rather, like "juggler," "jogger," or "strip club
goer," it is viewed, rightly or wrongly, as a recreational choice incidental to
one's constitution. The advantage of this approach over the Justice Handy
approach is that its rule of decision is not the fact of social consensus, but the
legal principle that status-definitional conduct forms part of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause. What doctrine asks of its principles is
that they define with consistency the contours of the relevant legal debate. The
first approach, awarding due process protection to conduct that social
consensus recognizes as deserving due process protection, generates no criteria
for debate. The second approach allows lawyers, judges, and academics to

81.

See Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 637-44 (1949).

82.

PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 41 (1982).
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engage in Socratic dialogue over whether status-definitional conduct, however
defined, is sufficiently important or coherent to warrant incorporation into
substantive due process.
If this approach sounds difficult to apply, that's because it is. In essence, I
have told judges that the bases are ninety feet apart, and that the object is to
cross home plate, but I have yet to tell them how to swing a bat. "However
defined," in other words, is the trick. But judges identify social consensus all
the time. Sometimes they do it openly, as when they conduct the Eighth
Amendment's "evolving standards of decency" analysis. 8" In recent cases, this
inquiry has focused on national surveys of both codified laws and actual
penological practices, along with the secular trends evident therein, the
opinions of professional organizations, foreign and international law and
custom, and even, in Atkins v. Virginia, public opinion polls. 8 4 More often, no
doubt, judges more tacitly recognize the evolutions in national opinion that
generate particular social facts. For example, the number and quality of amicus
briefs submitted in support of the University of Michigan in the Gratz v.
Bollingerand Grutterv. Bollingeraffirmative action cases were more than just an
application of raw political pressure; they were designed, successfully, to
demonstrate to the Justices a consensus around a particular social fact -that
racial diversity in higher education is socially beneficial.8s
So how might judges go about identifying a social consensus that particular
conduct defines a status rather than simply describes an activity? As in the
Eighth Amendment context, the overall landscape of American law is certainly
relevant: To what extent is the status associated with the conduct at issue
generally recognized as a legal and social category? With respect to sodomy, a
more robust inquiry into social consensus than the Lawrence majority engaged
in might have examined, for example, the extent to which sexual orientation is
included as a classification in state antidiscrimination laws, or social scientific
research on the relative immutability of homosexuality 8 6 or the salience of gay

83.

See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, lOl (1958).

84. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002); see also Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183

(200S).
85. See, e.g., Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 10-27, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. o2-241),
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516); Brief of the Harvard Black Law
Students Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10-14, Grutter, 539 U.S.
306; Brief of 13,922 Current Law Students at Accredited American Law Schools as Amici

Curiae in Support ofRespondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
86. As others have noted, a trait need not necessarily be biological in order to be immutable. See,
e.g., Donald Braman, OfRace and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375, 1378 n.6 (1999).
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"culture.",8 On the flip side, a judge might note the very existence of
Colorado's Amendment 2, which was a powerful indicator that "gay" had been
recognized as a status to an extent that "juggler" or "masturbator" has not. A
polity does not develop sufficient political momentum to seek to exclude a class
of individuals from the political process unless that class has been recognized as
a status group, with competing, if "repugnant," political claims.8 8 One could
hardly imagine a variant on Amendment 2 being proposed or passed with
respect to nudists; and if it were, it would indicate, perhaps, that it was time
for the claims of nudists qua nudists to be taken seriously by judges.
Given this limited role for social consensus, and accepting that standards
exist for identifying that consensus, Justice Scalia's list of threatened morals
laws begins to diminish. 8 As suggested, there is hardly an identifiable social
consensus that masturbators or those who have sex with animals are, like gays,
a class of individuals whose life choices are not merely "deviant" incidents of
their personalities, but are in fact constitutive of their personhood,9" and
prostitution is commonly thought of as a labor not of love, but of necessity.
Bigamy and same-sex marriage are more difficult to distinguish. As I have
discussed, marriage earns its status as a fundamental right under our
jurisprudence precisely because it is "an association that promotes a way of
life." 9" Not only is marriage almost explicitly excluded from Lawrence's sweep,
however, but it is also problematic to refer to bans on certain types of
marriages as a form of sanctioning or punishment. Lawrence does not demand
(as resort to the Equal Protection Clause might) that the state not discriminate
against gays at all, only that it not use its coercive power to criminalize their
identities. Although criminal sanctions for particular cohabitational choices,
say, may indeed raise Lawrence problems, refusing to extend formal legal
recognition to particular social arrangements is hardly analogous.

87.

See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, iii YALE L.J. 769, 845 (2002) (cataloging "aspects of culture,

including but not limited to gender-atypical activity, associated with being a gay man or
being a lesbian").
88. The military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy provides another example of social consensus
around homosexuality as a status, in that it sanctions individuals who engage in homosexual
conduct only if the individuals are, "in fact," homosexual. See Mary Anne Case, Of "This"
and "That" in Lawrence v Texas, 2003 SuP. CT. REV. 75, 89.
89.

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

go.

Moreover, as Sunstein has observed, there are no laws against masturbation. Sunstein, supra
note 61, at 49.

91.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying
text.
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3. On the Politicsof Recognition
Another way to understand the meaning of metaprivacy is through William
Eskridge's taxonomy of identity-based social movements. 92 Eskridge has
described three stages of such movements. At stage one, a "[m]inority group
challenges consensus that its distinguishing trait (color, sex, sexuality) is a
malignant variation from the norm. '9 3 At stage two, "[siociety revises
consensus to allow that the minority trait is a tolerable variation but not as
good as the norm."94 Finally, in stage three, society again "revises consensus to
recognize that the minority trait is a benign variation and that there is no single
norm."95 In my view, Justice Kennedy's opinion is best read as solidifying a
transition, one begun in Romer, from stage zero to stage one; that is, from not
being a constitutionally recognized identity group at all to being one whose
standing as a member of the polity is recognized, if grudgingly. 9 6 As Justice
Scalia argued vociferously in Romer,97 this recognition is a precondition to the
(John Hart) Elysian protection of gay political representation that Amendment
2 threatened, and that race-based and sex-based minority groups
98
unquestionably enjoy.
Eskridge himself would contest the above characterization of the opinion.
Calling the post-Lawrence landscape "nothing less than, but also nothing more
than, a jurisprudence of tolerance," 99 Eskridge has argued that the phase shift
that Romer and Lawrence represent for gays is analogous to the shift that Brown
0 '
v. Board ofEducation ° ° and Loving v. Virginia"
represented for blacks, and that

Roe v. Wade"0 2 and Craigv. Boren10 3 represented for women.10 4 In practice, this

See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062, 2065 (2002).
93. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by
92.

Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279,

1296 (2005).

94. Id.
95. Id.

96. Cf Katherine M. Franke, Commentary, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104
COLUM. L. REv. 1399, 1413 (2004) ("Lawrence recognizes, in a manner far more robust than
Romer v. Evans, that homosexuals are rights-bearing subjects.").
91.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640-41 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

98. See Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1077 (discussing the value of "assurjing] each clashing group
an opportunity to persuade the community of its normative agenda").
99. Id. at 1025.
100. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

101. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
102.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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means that the Court has reached stage two, wherein it "accept[s] the norm
that sexual variation is tolerable as a matter of fact and ought to be treated as
presumptively irrelevant as a matter of law." ' 5 In my view, Eskridge overstates
the Court's solicitude of gay claims in Romer and Lawrence. I think it significant
that the Court refused to accept an express invitation to elevate sexual
orientation to a suspect classification and therefore explicitly to apply
heightened scrutiny to regulations that discriminate against gays.1" 6 The
Court's unwillingness even to confront the appropriate level of scrutiny at least
undermines the claim that a particularized tolerance for gays was the majority's
central animating concern. 10 7 Rather, I argue, the Court was using gay rights
cases to reinforce first principles of representative government -that conduct
rather than status must be the subject of criminal law. In any event, my
differences with Eskridge on this score may be largely semantic. I agree with
his bottom line, that "traditionalists can no longer deploy the state to hurt gay
people or render them presumptive criminals, but room remains for the state to
signal the majority's preference for heterosexuality, marriage, and traditional
family values.,,1os
Deeper are my differences with Eskridge on the role of social consensus. A
key feature of his "politics of recognition" is the role of the gay rights
movement itself in forcing the Court's hand. Because Eskridge's is a story of
how constitutional change occurs on the ground, it is vital to his account that
the discriminated-against group so characterize itself, and that it advance a
political agenda. Wrote Eskridge, "The key to understanding Lawrence- and all
its doctrinal complexities -is -the Supreme Court's recognition that American

103. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
104. Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1o4o; see also McGowan, supra note 32, at 1332-34 (arguing that

Lawrence fits into Eskridge's scheme.

io5. Eskridge, supra note 21, at

1040.

io6. Justice O'Connor would have struck down the Texas sodomy law under the Equal
Protection Clause; in her view it failed even rational basis review. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
579 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Laurence Tribe has called the Equal
Protection Clause route a "dead end," arguing that relying on the Clause would have been
inadequate to the task of protecting the dignity of gays. Tribe, supra note 37, at 1907-16.
Tribe, however, implicitly accepted Justice O'Connor's rational basis standard of review. See
id. Justice Kennedy defended his recourse to the Due Process Clause by saying that reliance
on the Equal Protection Clause would leave open the question of whether a gender-neutral

statute would be constitutional. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
107. But see Pamela S. Karlan, Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1447
rights cases are making tiers-of-scrutiny analysis anachronistic).
ios. Eskridge, supra note

1882

21,

at

(2004)

1o25.
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democratic pluralism must meet the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered
(LGBT) rights movement at least halfway.' '10 9
For Eskridge, then, the self-definition of the group itself necessarily
motivates the social consensus. Although it is difficult to dispute that only a
sufficiendy robust movement can generate the political conditions necessary
for the kinds of regime shifts with which Eskridge is concerned, there is no
indication within the Lawrence majority opinion itself that such agitation forms
part of the doctrinal test. Lawrence, that is, does not source its emerging
awareness within the gay rights movement. The right I suggest that the Court
has recognized is not libertarian in a formal sense. It permits society to use law,
as it always has, to circumscribe expressive conduct. But Lawrence alters the
criteria upon which putatively protected expressive conduct is to be formally
judged. The question is not what is being expressed, but rather who. Does the
conduct at issue identify someone as a member of a sociopolitical entity, or
does it do no more than identify someone as a person who participates in the
conduct? This question cannot be answered by asking the sodomist, the
prostitute, or the nudist- the Lawrence Court was not prepared to cede control
so completely."' Rather, we must put the question to the People, and as
Amendment 2 demonstrated, their actions may speak louder than their words.
II.

ON CONSTITUTIONAL FIT

I have attempted to articulate thus far how Lawrence might be explained in
a way that makes it useful for future application. But a principled decision owes
a debt to its past as well as its future. Ronald Dworkin has famously described
the analytic process a principled judge goes through in adjudicating hard cases.
He argued that she must observe the doctrine of "political responsibility."''
That is, the principle that gives rise to her rule of decision must "fit" settled
legal rules and practices; it must be "shown to be consistent with earlier
decisions not recanted, and with decisions that the institution is prepared to
make in ...hypothetical circumstances."" 2 Then, if multiple decisional rules fit
the existing legal landscape, the jurist chooses the normative theory that best

log. Id.
11o. Given that the encounter in Lawrence was a one-night stand, see Tribe, supra note 37, at

1904-05, emphasizing the Court's responsiveness to the gay rights movement also would
have won Kennedy neither rhetorical nor political points.
111.RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 87 (1977).
11.

Id. at 88.
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justifies the present body of law. '3 I have thus far been relatively inattentive to
these external interpretive constraints.
This Part demonstrates that the conception of metaprivacy just sketched is
not a radical departure from settled rules. Neither is it inconsistent with extant
understandings of what a liberal democratic political order requires of the
relationship between personal privacy and government regulation. To wit, this
Part briefly discusses the relationship between metaprivacy and the extant
privacy doctrine and literature.
A. ConstitutionalPrivacyin the Courts
The privacy right as understood in American jurisprudence encompasses a
potpourri of distinct if related concepts: the freedom not to have one's name or
likeness appear in advertisements without consent;" 4 the freedom from
government intrusion into one's home and personal effects;11 the freedom to
hold a group meeting without providing a membership list to the
government;"' the freedom to use contraceptives ;117 the freedom to marry; '
and the freedom to have noncommercial sexual relations with consenting
adults" 9 all have been defended under the same banner. The privacy doctrine
can be segregated into at least three broad categories: tort privacy, Fourth
Amendment privacy, and fundamental-decision privacy. 2 ° To elucidate the
thread that runs through these doctrinal species of privacy, I briefly discuss
each in turn.
1. Tort Privacy
Privacy has a quotidian meaning that we all essentially understand, even if
it escapes precise definition. Our right to privacy protects us from the

113.

See id. at

io6-07.

See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., So S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
ii6. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
117. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972) (extending Griswold to unmarried persons).
114.
115.

118. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
119. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
12o.

Some have identified more. See, e.g., Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years ofPrivacy, 1992 WIS.
L. REV. 1335 (suggesting "First Amendment" privacy and "state constitutional" privacy as
additional categories).
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nonconsensual prying of others into matters we consider to be personal or
intimate. Thus it protects us from peeping Toms, both literal and
metaphorical. When Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote their seminal
1890 article, The Right to Privacy,12' they had this quotidian meaning in mind.
According to William Prosser, Warren was upset at the aggressive coverage the
Boston newspapers had been giving to his wife's high society parties,
particularly the recent wedding of the Warrens' daughter.12 Warren's revenge
was to conspire with his former law partner Brandeis to declare, in the pages of
the Harvard Law Review, a "right 'to be let alone'." ' ..3 Each individual, they
argued, has a common law right to determine "to what extent his thoughts,
sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others," '14 to decide, that
is, "whether that which is his shall be given to the public.""'5 According to
Warren and Brandeis, the palpable injury to the individual caused by
unwarranted invasions of this right is and should be actionable. While Warren
and Brandeis did not invent the privacy tort, theirs represents the first attempt
to define its contours comprehensively. And over the next decade, several
courts also began to recognize a common law right to determine the uses of
one's image by others." 6

122.

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (189o).
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 383 (196o).

123.

Warren & Brandeis, supra note

121.

29

121,

at 195 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS

(2d ed. 1888)). The anecdote has some holes, to say the least. As Ken Gormley has noted,

the Warrens' daughter was six years old in 189o. See Gormley, supra note 12o, at 1349.
124.

Warren & Brandeis, supra note

125.

Id. at 199.

121,

at 198.

126. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., So S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905) (holding that the

plaintiff-artist could invoke his privacy rights in suing an insurance company for the use of
his endorsement and his image in an advertisement without his consent); Corliss v. E. W.
Walker Co., 64 F. 280, 282 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894) (declaring in dicta that "the right of a
private individual to prohibit the reproduction of his picture or photograph should be
recognized and enforced"); Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N.Y.S. 908, 909 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (enjoining
the use of the plaintiff actor's name and photograph in a newspaper popularity contest);
Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 18 N.Y.S. 240 (Sup. Ct. 1891) (enjoining the use
of a doctor's name in an advertisement for certain medicinal pastilles); Schuyler v. Curtis, 15
N.Y.S. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1891) (enjoining the erecting of an unauthorized statue to
commemorate the philanthropy of the plaintiffs deceased family member); Manola Seeks an
Injunction, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 189o, at 2 (reporting a case in which a photographer was
enjoined from publishing a photograph of an actress wearing tights on stage); Miss Manola
Gets an Injunction, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 189o, at 3 (same); Photographed in Tights, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 189o, at

2

(same).
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The twentieth century saw the right to control the use of one's image in
public establish itself still more firmly at common law, 27 under a handful of
state statutes,2 8 and in the Restatement of Torts. 2 9 In 196o, Prosser advanced
the legal community's understanding of "private" privacy rights by identifying
four distinct torts: (1)"[i]ntrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or
into his private affairs"; (2) "[p]ublic disclosure of embarrassing private facts
about the plaintiff'; (3)"[p] ublicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in
the public eye"; and (4)"[a]ppropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the
plaintiff's name or likeness.""' Although Prosser fairly characterized the
direction in which tort privacy evolved, one hears in Warren and Brandeis
echoes of a broader philosophical claim, even if they advanced it only
instrumentally. The right to privacy, they wrote, is "part of the more general
right to the immunity of the person, -the right to one's personality."' 3 ' A right
to "personality" is by no means self-defining, though the right to private
control of one's public image is one of several options. I discuss other
contenders below.
2.

FourthAmendment Privacy

The Brandeis legacy is, of course, much larger than the privacy tort.
Brandeis's views on privacy must be read in pari materia with his general view
of the appropriate relationship between individuals and the social and political
institutions that threaten to dominate their lives. Brandeis was averse to the
commodification of our social life and what he referred to as "The Curse of
Bigness" both in the private sector and in government. 3 ' Like Mill's,
Brandeis's individualism was civic-minded; he believed that the political

127.

By 196o, only four state courts-in Rhode Island, Nebraska, Texas, and Wisconsin-had
expressly rejected a common law privacy right. Prosset, supranote 122, at 388.

123.

See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-8 to -9 (1953) (making appropriation a misdemeanor
and providing a private cause of action for damages); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (1950)
(providing for a suit in equity or for damages); Act of Apr. 6, 1903, ch. 132, §§ 1-2, 1903
N.Y. Laws 308, 308 (making appropriation of one's "name, portrait or picture" for the
purposes of trade or advertising a misdemeanor and providing a cause of action in equity or
for damages).

129. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939).

130. Prosser, supra note 122, at 389.
131. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 121, at 207.

David W. Levy,
Brandeis and the ProgressiveMovement, in BRANDEIS AND AMERICA 99, 111 (Nelson L. Dawson

132.See PHILIPPA STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM 72-99 (1993);

ed., 1989).
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dialogue necessary for a healthy democratic state presupposed a respect for
individual liberty.' 3
Naturally then, Brandeis's concern for privacy rights was not limited to the
private sphere. As Justice Brandeis, he articulated, in dissent in Olmstead v.
United States,'4 the Court's first comprehensive recognition of a right to
privacy against the state:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be
found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men .... [E]very unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
3
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.'
As Brandeis recognized, the Fourth Amendment is the Constitution's most
evident application of the spirit of the privacy tort to the public sphere.' 36 It
asks, in effect, under what circumstances and subject to what limitations
government agents may invade an individual's private space and search her
belongings against her will. The Fourth Amendment does not mention
"privacy" in express terms. The right it speaks of, that "of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures,' ' 3 7 appears to sound more in property than in privacy."38

supra note

133.

See

134-

277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The Olmstead majority rejected a
challenge to a federal wiretap on the ground that the Fourth Amendment applied only to
either "an official search and seizure of [one's] person, or... papers or... tangible material
effects," or "an actual physical invasion of [one's] house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of
making a seizure." Id. at 466 (majority opinion).

135.

Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

STRUM,

132, at 2.

136. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757, 758 (1994)

(commenting that the "global command" of the Fourth Amendment "that all government
searches and seizures be reasonable sounds not in criminal law, but in constitutional tort
law"); Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 49, 51
(declaring that the Fourth Amendment protects "interests in bodily integrity, mental
tranquility, and freedom of movement traditionally protected by tort actions").
137.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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In the years since Olmstead, however, the Court has attempted to give
definition to the meaning of the word "persons" in the search-and-seizure
context.'39
A pair of Warren Court decisions partially vindicated Brandeis but, in so
doing, substantially contributed to the confusion in this area. First, in Warden
v. Hayden,'4' a case involving a warrantless search that yielded various personal
items of a man eventually convicted of armed robbery, the Court held that the
search was valid even though the items obtained were "mere evidence" rather
than "instrumentalities, fruits, or contraband." 14' The reason the so-called mere
evidence rule was no longer applicable, Justice Brennan wrote, was that the
protections of the Fourth Amendment attached not to particular categories of
property, but to individuals: "We have recognized that the principal object of
the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property, and
have increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on property
1 42
concepts. '
Seven months later the Court expanded upon its newfound Fourth
Amendment privacy conception in Katz v. United States, 43 which held that the
exclusionary rule applied to an FBI recording of a conversation on a device
placed outside a telephone booth. "IT] he Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places," wrote Justice Stewart. "What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected." ' 44 Justice Harlan's Katz
concurrence spelled out the test of whether a situation or location is one that an
individual seeks to preserve as private. 4 He articulated a two-part
requirement, "first that a person [exhibit] an actual (subjective) expectation of

138. See Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and

Liberty in ConstitutionalTheory, 48 STAN. L. REv. 555, 562 (1996).

139. The Court's earliest effort at Fourth Amendment interpretation came in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), in which the Court held unconstitutional the compelled
production of an invoice for allegedly illegally imported plate glass.
140. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
141. Id. at 300 (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. Id. at 304.

143. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
144. Id. at 351 (citations omitted).
145. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
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expectation be one that society is prepared to
privacy and, second, that' the
6
recognize as 'reasonable. 1114
Significantly, the reasonable expectation of privacy test that Katz birthed is
not a measure of the general issue, whether a governmental intrusion is
unreasonable -for this inquiry, probable cause will suffice-but is rather a test
of whether a warrant or any other qualification is even required in the first
place. Had the FBI agents only taken the trouble to seek a warrant, the Katz
Court suggested that they would have obtained one and the search would have
been constitutional. 147 "[I] n substituting reasonable expectations of privacy for
property rights as the focus of fourth amendment protection, the Court was
not substituting one inviolable interest for another," one commentator wrote.
"It appears that the Court now believed that the sole function of that
amendment is to ensure that privacy is not invaded in an arbitrary manner,
rather than to ensure that privacy receives absolute protection against
invasion.'' 1, 8 The effect of this shift was to convert the Fourth Amendment
inquiry into a probable cause test. This is not quite what Justice Brandeis had
alone, as against the government,
in mind when he called the right to be 1let
"the right most valued by civilized men." 49
With Hayden and Katz, the Court achieved Brandeis's vision of unmooring
the Fourth Amendment from fetishistic property protection, but did not
concomitantly maintain the heightened scrutiny that both the Boyd Court and
Brandeis considered essential to the review of rights they thought
fundamental.' Thus, a doctrinal void was formed. Justice Stewart recognized
as much when he wrote in Katz that "the Fourth Amendment cannot be
translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy'. ...Other provisions
of the Constitution protect personal privacy from other forms of governmental
invasion."'"' Heightened protection of man's "spiritual nature"'' 2 would be left
to other constitutional provisions and their attendant jurisprudence.

146. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

at 354-55 (majority opinion).
147. See id.
148. Note, The Life and Times ofBoyd v. United States (1886-1976), 76 MICH. L. REv. 184, 203
(1977).

149. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
1so. See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the FourthAmendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
197, 199 (1993) (suggesting that present Fourth Amendment doctrine most closely parallels
rational basis review); see also Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410,

1s.
1S2.

1424-25 (1974) (suggesting that fundamental-decision privacy does not necessarily protect
the more obvious invasions of privacy encompassed within the Fourth Amendment).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal

1889

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

115:18 62

20o6

3. Fundamental-DecisionPrivacy
The development of a more transcendent constitutional right of privacy, of
the sort envisioned by Brandeis in his Olmstead dissent, would come in 1963, in
Griswold v. Connecticut,5 3 though it was a long time in the making. As early as
1914, Margaret Sanger had begun agitating for a woman's right to control her
own fertility, in a self-published monthly magazine called The Woman Rebel. "4
An obvious thread within the Warren and Brandeis conception of privacy as
sovereignty over one's public image views being "let alone" not as an end in
itself but as a means to personal autonomy. The Woman Rebel took as its
subtitle "No Gods No Masters," ' because privacy in its most transcendent
form is about control. Woman, that is, should be the mistress of her own
destiny, and repeal of the anti-birth-control laws was necessary to her
emancipation from a form of economic slavery. Wrote Sanger in an editorial in
the magazine's first issue, "No plagues, famines or wars could ever frighten the
capitalist class so much as the universal practice of the prevention of

conception.",,,6

The application of the privacy right to contraception was the brainchild of
Fowler Harper, a Yale Law School professor and antigovernment gadfly. 5 7 As
counsel for the plaintiffs in Poe v. Ullman, s8 the second of three direct legal
challenges to Connecticut's anti-birth-control laws, 5 9 Harper devoted a section
of his merits brief to the privacy rights of married people. He quoted Justice
Brandeis's Olmstead dissent and argued that the Connecticut statute was a
"colossal irrelevancy to any proper concern of the legislature of the State of

153.

381 U.S. 479 (1965).

154. DAVID J. GARRow, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF
ROE V. WADE lo (1998).

155. WOMAN REBEL, Mar. 1914, at

i, reprinted

in WOMAN REBEL

1 (Alex Baskin ed., 1976)

[hereinafter Baskin].
156. Editorial, The Prevention of Conception, WOMAN REBEL, Mar. 1914, at 8, reprinted in Baskin,
supra note 155, at 8. The Mathusian undertones of this rhetoric were self-conscious. See
Clara Newcome, Neo-Malthusianism- What It Is, WOMAN REBEL, May 1914, at 2, reprinted in
Baskin, supra note 155, at 26.
157. In 1946, Fowler resigned from the Indiana University Board of Trustees on suspicion of
being a communist sympathizer. Later, while at Yale, he persuaded twenty-two of his
colleagues to sign an open letter calling for the abolition of the House Un-American
Activities Committee. See GARRow, supra note 154, at 148-49.
I58. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).

i5.

The first was Tileston v. Ullman, 26 A.2d 582 (Conn. 1942), which the Supreme Court

dismissed on standing grounds, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (per curiam).
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Connecticut. ,,6 The state, Harper urged, had an obligation to accord equal
respect to the conscience and beliefs of those who believe in and wish to use
contraceptives "in the privacy of the home. "16 ' Although the Court dismissed
Poe on standing grounds,16 2 Justice Douglas's dissent laid the seeds for a vast
expansion of constitutional rights against the government. After quickly
dismissing the justiciability issue as chimerical, 63 he outlined the thick liberty
interest for birth control patients that would soon command a majority. On
Justice Douglas's view, the liberty of which the Due Process Clause speaks "is a
conception that sometimes gains content from the emanations of other specific
guarantees or from experience with the requirements of a free society. " 64
Although Justice Douglas did suggest that the Connecticut statute was
inconsistent with the spirit of the Third Amendment, .6' he did not cull his
support primarily from constitutional text. He cited instead a long passage
from an article in a journal called NaturalLaw Forum:
"One of the earmarks of the totalitarian understanding of society is that
it seeks to make all subcommunities -family, school, business, press,
church -completely subject to control by the State.... In a democratic
political order, this megatherian concept is expressly rejected as out of
social good, and with the
accord with the democratic understanding of
66
actual make-up of the human community.",
It hardly seems fitting to describe a statute that has been enforced once in
eighty-one years in such Orwellian terms, but Justice Douglas's program was
broader than one little blue law. To be sure, his particular account of the
appropriate relationship between citizen and democratic government did not
accurately describe the United States in 1960. Seven years before Loving v.

16o. Brief for Appellant at 28, Poe, 367 U.S. 497 (No. 60).
161.
Id.
162.

The Court held that, given that the only known prosecution under the anti-birth control
statute was State v. NeLson, ii A.2d 856 (Conn. 1940), no actual case or controversy was
before the Court. Poe, 367 U.S. at 501-02.

163.

Poe, 367 U.S. at 510-13 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

164.

Id. at 517 (citation omitted).
Id. at 522. The Third Amendment states: "No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law." U.S. CONST. amend. III.

165.

166.

Poe, 367 U.S. at

521-22

(Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Robert L. Calhoun, Democracy and

Natural Law, 5 NAT. L.F. 31, 36 (96o)).

Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal

1891

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

115: 1862

20o6

Virginia,6 , much of America could well be called "megatherian," and indeed
the understanding of "social good" Justice Douglas would himself endorse
thirteen years later in Roe v. Wade was not obviously democratic. But the antitotalitarian, anti-control normative aspiration Justice Douglas's dissent
had motivated Sanger and carries
represents captures much of what
6
considerable purchase even today. 1
When Griswold finally came down in 1965, then, it was anything but
spontaneous. Justice Douglas's opinion for the majority made clear, if nothing
else, that the right to privacy could not be cabined within a single
constitutional norm. The First Amendment protections of associational rights,
the Third and Fourth Amendment protections against government intrusion
upon one's home and personal effects, and the Fifth Amendment protections of
one's inner thoughts conspire to create "zones of privacy. ' ,, 69 Since Griswold,
the Court has found that the constitutional right to fundamental-decision
privacy protects the use of contraceptives by single people1 70 and minors;171 the
ability of prisoners or those behind in their child support to marry; 72 the
possession of pornography in one's home;' 73 and, most controversially, a
woman's decision to have an abortion. 74 But the right does not, for example,
extend to the decision to ask a physician to end one's own life;17 a family's
decision to impose euthanasia without clear consent of the patient;176 or a
parent's decision to send her child to a segregated school. "
In attempting to distinguish between those activities that are protected by
the right to fundamental-decision privacy and those that are not, the essential
question is, what is the substance and scope of the ultimate end being
protected? Margaret Sanger, Justice Douglas, and, to a lesser extent, Justice

167. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).

168. Justice Harlan dissented separately in Poe, but his opinion more directly invoked the
doctrinal connection with the Fourth Amendment. Poe, 367 U.S. at 548-51 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
16q. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
170. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
171. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 691-99 (1977) (plurality opinion).
172. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
173.

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).

174. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).

17S. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
176. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (199o).
1'7. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 16o, 177-79 (1976).
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Harlan articulated an anti-totalitarian vision concerned with the state's ability
to control the lives of its citizens. On this view, certain rights, such as the
family's inherent right to sovereignty, are less appropriately subject to political
regulation than others. Fowler Harper embraced a more Lockean approach
that, while not excluding the anti-totalitarian view, emphasizes a woman's
right to controvert the morals of the community as an exercise of her liberty of
conscience.
The abortion cases give us considerable guidance on the extent to which
these conceptions of privacy have survived doctrinally. Roe v. Wade declared in
clear terms remarkably similar to Lawrence that a woman's right to have an
abortion is a constitutionally protected privacy right "founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty." 17' The Court deemed
fundamental the decision whether to terminate one's pregnancy because of the
impact childbirth can have on the mother's future life plans. Not only might
pregnancy carry medical risks, but "[m]aternity, or additional offspring, may
force upon the woman a distressful life and future," due to psychological stress,
the burdens of child care, social stigma, and the like. 179 Presenting an abortion
ban as working a kind of Hobson's choice illustrates Roe's connection both to
Griswold and to Lawrence. As Sanger argued, a prohibition on contraceptives
effects a form of slavery on women that forces them to choose between
childbearing and abstinence. Analogously, a prohibition on sodomy forces gays
into a choice between criminality and the closetsO Balanced against a decision
deemed fundamental because of its profound impact on the life of an
individual, the moral qualms of the community seem cruel and trifling.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, in which a Court plurality changed Roe's
categorical tripartite framework into an "undue burden" balancing test, picked
up this thread. s Of most interest to my analysis is the sweeping language the
plurality used to justify its reaffirmation of fundamental-decision privacy as
applied to the abortion decision. As with prior opinions, the Court described
the protected zone of privacy as "a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter. '' ,8 But just as Griswold construed that realm as
transcending the physical curtilage of the home and reaching certain private
choices by individuals, Casey extended Roe's protective net into more abstract

178.

Roe, 410

179.

Id.

18o.

See supra text accompanying notes

U.S. at 153.

51-52.

181. 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).

182. Id. at 847.
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space. In one of its most cited passages, the Court wrote that the issues to
which a privacy right had been extended
involv[e] the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in
a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, [and]
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under compulsion of the State.
...The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on
her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in
society.' 8 3
Fundamental-decision privacy, on this formulation, is not about privacy at
all, at least not as conventionally understood. Until Casey, it was possible to
view the Court's privacy decisions through a fictional prophylactic lens.
Consider the following reading: The constitutional right of privacy protects
against unwarranted physical invasions of the home. A statute barring the use
of contraceptives, barring the viewing of pornography, or barring abortions
cannot properly be enforced without a physical invasion of the home. Although
Roe's language about the impact of childbearing on the mother's life course
undermines such a formalistic reading of the fundamental-decision cases, such
a reading still could serve to moor these cases to traditional notions of privacy
grounded in physical space, and provide guidance in future decisions. Casey,
however, linked fundamental-decision privacy explicitly to concepts of
autonomy, personal conscience, and self-definition.1s4
Bowers v. Hardwick had already been decided six years prior to Casey, a
convenience which, by leaving on the table anti-sodomy laws and like morals
legislation, provided additional cover for the Casey plurality's open-ended
claims about the nature of constitutional privacy. Bowers had drawn a line in
the sand. To those who thought that the incremental logic of common
lawmaking demanded a close examination of the asserted state interest in

183. Id. at 851-852. This portion of the opinion was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens and
thus commanded a majority.

184. Because Casey upheld controversial restrictions on abortion rights, political expediency
allowed and perhaps compelled the Court to speak in such far-reaching terms. See generally
GAAROW, supra note 154, at 700 (describing the reaction to Casey as follows: "Some pro-

choice groups ... self-defeatingly tried to insist that 'Roe v. Wade is dead,' while right to life
activists castigated the O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter trio as 'backstabbing' members of a
'wimp bloc."').
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regulating private, consensual, noncommercial sexual conduct, Justice White's
statement of the issue presented was more than mildly discouraging.' The
Bowers Court construed the doctrinal definition of fundamental rights
protected by substantive due process -those "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty"' 8 6 - as limited to those that were expressly permitted historically. But
Lawrence vindicated the vision of privacy that Justice Blackmun stated
succinctly in dissent:
This case is no more about 'a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy' . . than Stanley v. Georgia was about a
fundamental right to watch obscene movies, or Katz v. United States was
about a fundamental right to place interstate bets from a telephone
booth. Rather, this case is about 'the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, the right to be let
alone.S7

The majority framed the case as about the freedom to engage in sodomy.
The dissent framed the case as about freedom to make fundamental personal
decisions. The prophylactic fiction discussed above facilitated this debate by
minimizing the individual interest to the interest of a gay person in having sex
in his home, which is susceptible to interpretation as either more or less
important than the community's interest in policing morals.
After Casey, however, privacy interests were expressly defined as the
interests of all people in a measure of autonomy and self-definition. Thus
stated, the form that self-definition takes is more obviously irrelevant to the
constitutional analysis. The related anti-totalitarian view of privacy rights,
which I have associated with Margaret Sanger and Justice Douglas, sees
privacy as control of one's destiny. Understood in this way, privacy is
instrumental to the prospective identity of the individual, not merely to her
recreational choices.

185. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 19o (1986) (calling the issue "whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy"),
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
186. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).

187. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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B. ConstitutionalPrivacy in the Academy
Casey is a classic example of doctrine chasing theory. Owing to Griswold
and its progeny, the 196os and 1970S were the heyday of privacy scholarship.
The case failed to announce a holistic theory of privacy. Rather, each of the
opinions in Griswold attempted to argue from doctrine why the right of
married persons to use contraceptives was, in a sense, already constitutionally
protected. But the die had been cast. Griswold was one of those cases through
which doctrine leaps to a new orbit and, consequently, spawns a fresh set of
academic commentary. Thomas Grey wrote in 1983 that "[f]rom the first, the
Court's development of a right to privacy has suggested to philosophicalminded commentators the possible elevation to constitutional status of Mill's
principle of liberty. " SS This principle is the view that "the only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
8
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.',, ,
Constitutionalizing Mill's principle would have raised profound questions
about the legitimacy of laws against drug use, prostitution, and a host of other
arguably victimless crimes, and would have precipitated endless debate over
the meaning of a "self-regarding act."' One can safely say, however, that
Bowers shut the door on the harm principle. As doctrines mature, the rightsgenerating principles that spawned them crystallize into something closer to
rules, and the scope of their ancillary application narrows. But Lawrence was,
like Griswold before it, a quantum leap in the doctrine. It reinvigorated
hibernating theories of privacy, but at the same time forced them to reckon
with a new set of interpretive constraints and invitations.
In order to place into perspective the body of privacy scholarship that best
precipitates and embraces Lawrence-style metaprivacy, it will first be helpful to
discuss briefly some competing conceptions. One particularly inventive
approach that remains influential is Charles Fried's idea of privacy as a form of
social currency. Fried wrote his seminal article on the topic in 1968, three years
after Griswold and one year after Katz, when privacy had, as he noted, "become

188. THOMAS C. GREY,THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY 8 (1983).

i89. MILL, supra note 17, at 8o.
19o. Compare Joel Feinberg, Offensive Nuisances, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 278 (Joel Feinberg &

Jules Coleman eds., 2004) (highlighting nuisance as problematic for Mill's principle), with
HART, supra note 30, at 42 (arguing for a strong public-private distinction in delineating
self-regarding acts). One problem for both Mill and Hart is that they do not adequately
explain why community sensibility, even with respect to private acts, cannot serve as a
source of public duties.
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the object of considerable concern."' 9 1 Like Justice Kennedy, Fried viewed
privacy as central to self-definition. The difference is that, for Fried, privacy is
purely, but uniquely, instrumental to self-definition. Privacy preserves for the
individual a sphere of exclusive personal knowledge. Fried treated this personal
knowledge as a form of entitlement that the individual uses, in essence, to
purchase the fundamental social bonds of love, friendship, and trust. 192 Wrote
he, "Privacy is not merely a good technique for furthering these fundamental
relations; rather without privacy they are simply inconceivable."1' 93 Fried did
not argue that his was the only way of understanding privacy, only that his was
19 4
the only way that justifies the lofty status of the "right" to privacy.
A "market conception of personal intimacy"' 9 also emerges in Richard
Posner's work in this area. Posner viewed privacy not as an inflexible moral
right but as a tradable entitlement best assigned to the party that will use the
private information most efficiently.' 96 Neither Fried's nor Posner's
"economic" view of privacy rights captures Justice Kennedy's concerns in
Lawrence. Posner would subject privacy rights to the vagaries of the "market"
for such rights. Fried's conception places restrictions on the valuable uses of
privacy that Lawrence-style metaprivacy eschews. Lawrence prized a definitional
autonomy that is "transcendent," plausibly extending beyond love, friendship,
and trust. Moreover, Fried's conception is overinclusive, in that it assigns a
meaning to the alienation of one's privacy entitlement that may not always be
present. 97 In any event, it is safe to assume that the Lawrence majority would
reject the commodification of the right it seeks to protect.
Lloyd Weinreb, on the other hand, has connected privacy explicitly to
human autonomy. In this way, his conception seems more closely to
approximate the metaprivacy ideal. He does not, however, believe that any
rights necessarily follow from this conception. Weinreb wrote that "privacy
might be regarded as the face that autonomy presents to others similarly
situated in the same community, merely one side of the abstract dichotomy
between public and private: Whatever is public is not private, and whatever is

191. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
192.

See id. at 484.

193. Id. at 477.
194. See id. at 484.
195. Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood,6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 32 (1976).
196. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Privacy, REGULATION, May-June 1978, at 19.

197. See, e.g., Reiman, supra note 195, at 33 ("One ordinarily reveals information to one's
psychoanalyst that one might hesitate to reveal to a friend or lover. That hardly means one
has an intimate relationship with the analyst.").
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private is not public. '' 198 Taking as axiomatic that humans have something
called "autonomy," and that it is this autonomy that enables them to be called
individuals, Weinreb believes that privacy is a conventional label for this
abstract notion. In this sense, neither privacy nor autonomy have any content
or can have any content. Rather, the public-private distinction is "scarcely
more than [a] reminder[] that human beings are at one and the same time
constituted as persons within a human community and autonomous." 99
Fried, Weinreb, and others who do not view the right to privacy as an
independent value-holder are responding to an older intellectual tradition that
sees privacy as both unique and valuable in many of the same ways as Justice
Kennedy appears to. Privacy as "personhood" is not a new idea. Roscoe Pound,
for example, is an early proponent of the idea that the law of torts should
protect an individual's "personality" interests, which include a right to physical
integrity and personal liberty, a reputational right to personal honor, and a
right to belief and opinion.2 00 Similarly, Jeffrey Reiman has advanced the
proposition that privacy represents "a social ritual by means of which an
individual's moral title to his existence is conferred."" 0 ' That is, a thick sense of
personal entitlement to one's thoughts, body, and actions is necessary to the
formation of "self."20 2 Whether conceptualized in terms of "personality" or
"selfhood," it is easy to see how "privacy" rights applied against the
government could eventually produce opinions like Roe and Lawrence.
But metaprivacy as I have described it also draws on a heretofore distinct
strand within privacy theory, the "privacy as autonomy" school. Louis Henkin
offered one of the earliest defenses of the position that the legal concept of
privacy post-Roe represents the moral freedom of an individual to pursue her
own projects and plans. Writing in 1974, Henkin argued that the Supreme
Court's recognition of privacy protected not "freedom from... intrusion" privacy's ordinary meaning-but "something
.
farther-reaching, an
additional zone of autonomy, of presumptive immunity to governmental

198. Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Right to Privacy, in THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 25, 31 (Ellen Frankel Paul

et al.
eds., 2000).
199. Id. at 34.
200. See Roscoe Pound, Interests in Personality, 28 HARV.L. REv. 343, 355 (1915).
2oi. Reiman, supra note 195, at 39 (emphasis omitted).
2o.

Id.; see also Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 156 (Ferdinand David

Schoeman ed., 1984) (arguing that public scrutiny creates conformity and thus makes us
less differentiated as people); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv.L. REv. 737, 752
n.93 (1989) (collecting sources that equate privacy with "personhood").
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regulation."" 3 Henkin traced the fundamental primacy of the individual lying
behind substantive due process to our constitutional ideal of limited
government. 0 4 The "liberty" protected by the Fifth Amendment, Henkin
wrote, echoing Justice Douglas's position in Poe, 05 "did not mean Adam Smith
but did mean John Stuart Mill. ",,o

6

Henkin was not troubled by the

constitutionalization of an open-ended, prima facie freedom from
governmental regulation for certain ill-defined fundamental rights. 0 7 He saw
it, rather, as a mandate to explore the "compelling state interest" side of the
inevitable balance between private rights and public good. Instead of focusing
all of our intellectual attention on defining the contours of the right, a
potentially fruitless exercise, we should have a robust discourse about the ends
for which society ever can intrude upon our individual autonomy. ,8
Joel Feinberg took the notion of privacy as autonomy a step further than
Henkin. "[I]f the privacy concept already attributed to the Constitution is not
identical to personal sovereignty," he went so far as to ask, "what can it be?" 2 °9
Feinberg argued that the Supreme Court's invocation of "privacy" is in fact the
constitutionalization of what philosophers call "personal autonomy" or "selfdetermination," meaning "the sovereign authority to govern oneself, which is
absolute within one's own moral 'boundaries."'" 1 These boundaries of
personal sovereignty, Feinberg suggested, extend not just to the limits of the
physical body but also to "the right to decide how one is to live one's life, in
particular how to make the critical life-decisions."2 ' Like Henkin, Feinberg
connected this idea of privacy explicitly to the philosophy of John Stuart Mill.
He argued that Mill's sphere of self-regarding acts is a good rough cut at the
limits of personal autonomy that the jurisprudential definition of privacy is

203.
204.

Henkin, supra note 15o, at 1411.
See id. at 1412-13. Some would tether a constitutional respect for the natural rights of the
individual to the stillborn Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
rather than to substantive due process. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 525-26 (1999)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BIuL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 163-80 (1998); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 22-30

205.

(198o).

See supra note 166 and accompanying text.

206. Henkin, supra note 150, at 1417.
207.

See id. at

2o8.

See id. at 1431.

1427.

a9. Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?,58 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 445,492 (1983).
210.

Id. at 446-47 (emphasis omitted).

211.

Id. at 454.
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attempting to substantiate2 1 2: "[R] espect for a person's autonomy is respect for
his unfettered voluntary choice as the sole rightful determinant of his actions
except where the interests of others need protection from him."2 3 Feinberg
lamented, however, that the Justices have too cavalierly recognized state power
to counteract certain fundamental rights through morals legislation that
"enforc[es] the requirements of decency" ;214 he would prefer a more absolute
embrace of Mill.
Feinberg wrote before Bowers, Casey, and Lawrence, and so his positive
description of American law comes with a significant caveat. We get further
with Jed Rubenfeld's conception of privacy. On Rubenfeld's account, privacy is
best understood not as an individual right to personhood, autonomy, or some
15
other fundamental entitlement, but as a prophylactic against state tyranny.
Writing three years after Bowers (but, presciently, three years before Casey),
Rubenfeld found the analysis of both the majority and the dissents in that
opinion lacking, namely because both called for arbitrary judicial decrees of the
limits of the privacy principle under discussion.216 Why, for example, does
fundamental-decision privacy protect the right to engage in homosexual
sodomy but not the right to engage in adultery or incest?2 17 Neither the
"privacy as personhood" nor the "privacy as autonomy" strands of the
academic literature satisfactorily explain, for Rubenfeld, "which choices and
decisions are protected. " 8 He offered the following conception in response:
Anti-abortion laws, anti-miscegenation laws, and compulsory
education laws all involve the forcing of lives into well-defined and
highly confined institutional layers. At the simplest, most quotidian
level, such laws tend to take over the lives of the persons involved: they
occupy and preoccupy. They affirmatively and very substantially shape
a person's life; they direct a life's development along a particular
avenue. These laws do not simply proscribe one act or remove one
liberty; they inform the totality of a person's life. 1 9

212.

Id. at 487.

213. Id. at 464 (emphasis omitted).

214. Id. at 489 (internal quotation marks omitted).
215.

See Rubenfeld, supra note 202, at 784.

216. See id. at 747-50.
217. See id.at 750.
218. Id. at 751.
219. Id. at 784.
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Rubenfeld's totalitarian conception of privacy in practice effectuates the
limited autonomy conception we see in Lawrence. Rubenfeld suggested that the
novelty of his conception lies in the sharp distinction he drew between an
inquiry into what the state is trying to forbid versus an inquiry into what the
state is producing.22 Rather than trying arbitrarily to limit the conduct the
state may regulate, he argued, we should instead reject governmental attempts
to control the lives of citizens. As I argued in Section I.B, the most consistent
justification Justice Kennedy offered for the majority position in Lawrence was
that "[t]he State cannot demean [petitioners'] existence or control their destiny
by making their private sexual conduct a crime."22' Because the conduct at issue
was status-definitional, regulating it necessarily subordinated gay Americans'
lives to the interests of the state - this was the linchpin of its
unconstitutionality.
This idea is the centerpiece of Justice Douglas's Poe dissent': Rubenfeld's
Orwellian state is the megatherian conception Douglas feared." "By all
accounts," wrote Rubenfeld, "privacy has everything to do with delineating the
legitimate limits of governmental power."' Also coded within this idea is the
quasi-First Amendment notion that we should be free to embody even
unpopular conceptions of the good. Ruth Gavison has written that privacy
provides a context within which we can deliberate about potentially deviant
ideas free from social pressure." Rubenfeld alluded to this freedom implicitly
one's life too
when he called privacy "the fundamental freedom not to have
" 6
,2
state.
normalizing
more
progressively
a
by
totally determined
Acting alone, however, Rubenfeld's presumptive autonomy ideal provides
only limited guidance to a judge deciding a hard case. Rubenfeld hoped that,
by reconceptualizing privacy rights along anti-normativity lines rather than
along fundamental rights lines, he could escape Mill's and Feinberg's
jurisprudential problem. But even if Rubenfeld succeeded at capturing the
common thread between laws against home schooling, abortion, and
sodomy -each "involve[s] a peculiar form of obedience that reaches far beyond

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 783.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 5s8, 578 (2003).
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521-22 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See supra text accompanying note 166.
Rubenfeld, supra note 202, at 737.
Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 448-56 (198o).
Rubenfeld, supra note 202, at 784.
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mere abstention from the particular proscribed act" 7 -his principle does no
better than Mill's at deciding actual cases and controversies.
Lawrence offered a solution to this problem through convention. Social
consensus around the status-definitional nature of proscribed conduct triggers
the presumptive protection against morals regulation to which Henkin,
Feinberg, and Rubenfeld attach normative value.
III. METAPRIVACY AND CRIMINAL SENTENCES

Having taken pains to articulate how Lawrence-style metaprivacy is neither
doctrinally nor theoretically sui generis, it is only natural that I suggest how
metaprivacy can actually be applied outside of the gay rights context. As
Rubenfeld has written, the time-honored (and generally inadvertent) tradition
of confining legal reasoning to intradoctrinal application "tends to suppress
"
appreciation of how differing lines of case law relate to one another. ,2s
Recognizing the ways in which similar reasoning applies in different doctrinal
contexts can make hard cases harder, but it has the benefit of enforcing the
analytic consistency necessary to the legitimate exercise ofjudicial review.
Lawrence is a case about punishment, but most commentary on its import
focuses on the threshold question of which rationales, if any, justify using the
criminal law to regulate primary conduct. 9 I have argued that Lawrence
restricts a community's use of the criminal law to suppress status
masquerading as conduct. One other area of law in which we conspicuously
permit communities to use criminal sanctions in just this way is in capital
sentencing. Accordingly, this Part argues that, if the principles of Lawrence are
to be applied interdoctrinally, a retributive rationale based on "character" is
constitutionally inadequate as a justification for capital punishment.
Two analytic moves are necessary to make out the argument. First, I must
demonstrate that the retributive rationale necessarily relies on a judgment
about the character of the accused. Second, I must demonstrate that this
judgment is status-linked in a constitutionally impermissible way. After
describing how the kinds of judgments made in the capital sentencing process
parallel those declared impermissible in Lawrence, I will respond to a number
of anticipated objections.

227.

Id. at 792-93.

228.

SeeJed Rubenfeld, The Anti-AntidiscriminationAgenda, il YALE L.J. 1141, 1145

229.

I use the term "primary conduct" to describe the day-to-day actions of free individuals, as
opposed to acts of negotiation with the criminal justice system. See Mackey v. United States,

(2002).

401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

1902

Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal

BEYOND LAWRENCE

A. Our Retribution Is Character-Based
Retributive punishments, oversimplified, rely on the idea that punishment
should be deserved. The obvious attraction of retribution is that it conforms
nicely to our intuitions about the morality of punishment.23 Although many
gradations of retributive punishment might be identified,23' retributive theories
can be broadly segregated into act-based and character-based models. An actbased model assigns moral value to particular acts, holding that "[a] person
who deserves punishment deserves it because, and only because, she has
performed a culpable wrongdoing." 3 ' By contrast, a character-based model
holds that "[a] person who deserves punishment deserves it because, and only
because, she has a bad moral character." 33
In the realm of capital punishment, the character-based theory of
retribution not only is dominant but is, in a sense, constitutionally required.
The overriding command of the Court's death penalty jurisprudence in the
years following Gregg v. Georgia"3 is that capital punishment must be

23o. The retributive rationale is in the midst of a philosophical renaissance. See

JAMES Q
WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN
AMERICA AND EUROPE 23-24 (2003) (describing the "philosophical revival of retributivism"

as "the most important Anglo-American movement of the last forty years or so"); Russell L.

Christopher, DeterringRetributivism: The Injustice of "Just"Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REV.
843, 845 (2002) (calling retributivism "all the rage").
231. Michael Moore's work in this area has been particularly innovative. See MICHAEL MOORE,
PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 83-188 (1997).

For examples of actbased retributive theories, see, for example, id. at 27, noting that "a bad character is neither
necessary nor sufficient for deserved punishment [and] the punishment that a wrongdoer
deserves [does not] track the badness of her moral character"; and ANDREW VON HIRSCH,

232. STEPHEN KERSHNAR, DESERT, RETRIBUTION, AND TORTURE 15 (2OO1).

PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS

IN THE SENTENCING OF

CRIMINALS 53 (19 8 5), stating that, "If the state is to carry out the authoritative response to
[wrongful] conduct.., then it should do so in a manner that testifies to the recognition that
the conduct is wrong."

233.

KERSHNAR,

supra note 232, at 15-16. For examples of character-based theories, see, for

example, KANT, supra note 6, at 1o6, which argues that only the death penalty appropriately
corresponds to the "inner wickedness" of a murderer;
EXPLANATIONS 383 (1981),

ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL

which suggests that punishment is only appropriate for acts

"attributed to a defect of character"; and Frederic R. Kellogg, From Retribution to "Desert":
The Evolution of Criminal Punishment, 15 CRIMINOLOGY 179 (1977), which argues that a

report by the Committee for the Study of Incarceration reflects a concern with the
individuation of punishment that finds relevant the offender's moral character.
234. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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appropriately individualized. 3 Writing for a five-Justice majority in Penry v.
Lynaugh, Justice O'Connor argued that "it is precisely because the punishment
should be directly related to the personal culpability of the defendant that the
jury must be allowed to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence relevant6
to a defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the offense.23
Character evidence introduced at the sentencing phase of a capital trial is often
designed to be mitigating, good traits speaking as well as bad traits to an
individual's moral character. The theory behind allowing evidence of good
works or community involvement is that a convict should be permitted to
rebut the judgment that his crime completely determines his moral worth. As
Russell Dean Covey has written, defendants must be allowed to introduce
mitigating evidence "to prove that their crime was not consistent with, or a
manifestation of, a morally defective or dangerous character."2 3 Consistent
with this understanding, one theory in support of a constitutional prohibition
on the execution of juveniles is that the character of a juvenile has not been
sufficiently concretized.238 Justice Kennedy embraced this theory in Roper v.
Simmons, writing that "[t]he reality that juveniles still struggle to define their
identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime
committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character."23 9
This inquiry into an individual's fundamental moral character thus is a central
feature of our death penalty jurisprudence.

235. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Woodson v.,North Carolina, 428 U.S. 28o
(1976); Jurekv. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).

U.S. 302, 327-28 (1989) (holding that, though the Eighth Amendment did not prevent
the execution of mentally retarded convicts, evidence as to mental retardation could not be
excluded as a mitigating factor), overruled in part by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

236. 492

237-

Russell Dean Covey, Exorcizing Wechsler's Ghost: The Influence of the Model Penal Code on
Death Penalty SentencingJurisprudence,31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 212 (2004).

238.

See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 834 (2003)
("[L]ike the adult actor who establishes mitigation, it can be said that the adolescent's
harmful act does not express his bad character; indeed, it does not manifest 'character' at all,
but something else- in this case, developmental immaturity.").
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1195 (2005). As the trial court in Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale reminded us through its inartful use of parentheses, "depravity" and "homosexuality"
have, at times, been used interchangeably. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. MON-C-33o92, slip. op. at 39 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Nov. 3, 1995) ("'Sodomy' is derived from the
name of the biblical city, Sodom, which, with the nearby city of Gomorrah, was destroyed
by fire and brimstone rained down by the Lord because of the sexual depravity (active
homosexuality) of their male inhabitants." (quoting Genesis 18:16-19:28 (King James))),
rev'd, 7o6 A.2d 270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), affd, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), rev'd,
530 U.S. 640 (2ooo).

239.

1904
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Actual statutory aggravators and mitigators reinforce this doctrinal
mandate. For the sake of economy, I will use as an example Texas, the state
that accounted for more than thirty-five percent of all executions nationwide
from 1977 to 2003. 4 A murder qualifies as capital murder under the Texas
Penal Code if any of the following conditions applies: the victim is known to be
a peace officer or a fireman in the course of duty; the murder is intentionally
committed in the course of committing another felony; it is a contract killing;
it is committed in the course of a prison escape; the defendant is incarcerated
and the victim is a prison employee; it is prison-gang related; there are
multiple victims; or the victim is a child under the age of six. 2 1 At the
sentencing phase of a capital murder trial, the state must prove intent to kill
and it must show that "there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society. '' 2 If the state carries its burden, the jury is further instructed to
answer whether life imprisonment should be imposed instead of death, "taking
into consideration all of the evidence, including the circumstances of the
offense, the defendant's character and background, and the personal moral
culpability of the defendant." 43 The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
additionally reiterates that the jury "shall consider mitigating evidence that a
juror might regard as reducing the defendant's moral blameworthiness.""
To summarize, the crimes to which Texas applies its capital murder statute
appear to be those that seem particularly socially injurious (e.g., murder of a
police officer, murder in the course of a prison escape) or particularly heinous
(e.g., murder of a small child). Although it is difficult to disaggregate the
different rationales, we can say broadly that the former category reflects a
deterrence rationale and the latter reflects some form of retributive rationale.
The deterrence rationale is further vindicated by the instruction that there must
be a probability of recidivism, and the retribution rationale is further
vindicated by the inquiry into character and moral blameworthiness. The view
of the Texas statutes is intensely personal: Identical crimes may be

24o. THOMAS P. BONCZAR & TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2003, at 9 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/

bjs/pub/pdf/cpo3.pdf.
241. TEx.PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03
242. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

(Vernon

2005).

art. 37.0711, § 3 (b)(2) (Vernon 2005).

§ 3(e).
Id. § 3(0(3).

243. Id.

244.

Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal

1905

115:18 62

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

2oo6

differentially punished based on the presence of a malevolent disposition
within the offender. 45
It is possible to argue that the inquiry into character is not grounded in
retribution at all, but rather serves the purposes of specific deterrence. Covey,
for example, has written that "the doctrine of individual consideration and the
decision to permit future dangerousness to be argued at the penalty phase both
grow out of a philosophical belief that capital sentencing decisions should turn
on non-retributive, offender-based evaluations of the defendant's character."146
Whatever its historical pedigree, the argument that the character inquiry
speaks only to future dangerousness is both implausible and constitutionally
problematic. The spectrum of positive character traits permitted under Lockett
v. Ohio, which prohibited states from limiting the scope of mitigating evidence
as it relates to a defendant's "record and character, ''1 4 7 is far broader than a
focus on future dangerousness would allow. As Stephen Garvey has pointed
out,,4 8 mitigators have ranged, either in dicta or in practice, from being "a fond
and affectionate
uncle," 9 to working with one's father as a painter and being
"a good son,"25 to winning a choreography prize,2"' to having a "peaceful
nature."252 In Texas, whose capital sentencing scheme I have just discussed, a
defendant's parole eligibility was not even admissible at the penalty phase until
1999 ;253 three years earlier, a Texas jury sentenced to death a convict suffering

245.

246.

This type of inquiry is not uncommon. See, e.g.,

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West 2005)
(providing as aggravators that "[t]he capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel," "was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner
without any pretense of moral or legal justification," or "was committed by . . . a sexual
predator ... or a person previously designated as a sexual predator who had the sexual
predator designation removed"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4636 (1995 & Supp. 2004)
(including as an aggravator "desecration of the victim's body in a manner indicating a
particular depravity of mind"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (e)(8) (West 2005)
(permitting as mitigating evidence "any other evidence of mitigation concerning the
character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense").
Covey, supra note 237, at 209. Covey argued that this philosophical belief is the progeny of
the utilitarian views of Herbert Wechsler, who helped draft the Model Penal Code. See id. at
207-24.

249.

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 589 (1978) (plurality opinion).
Stephen P. Garvey, 'As the Gentle Rain from Heaven": Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1026 & n.145 (1996).
Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397 (1987).

2SO.

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 8o8, 814 (1991).

251.

Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 382 n.5 (1990).

252.

California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 539 (1987).
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, §

247.
248.

253.
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from AIDS whose life expectancy was three years.2 s4 Common sense suggests
that the purpose of the character inquiry is not entirely or even primarily to
assess future dangerousness but rather to establish a link between conduct and
character, to "make the defendant's whole career and soul the subject of the
penalty trial"2 "s for the purpose of judging the extent to which he has
internalized norms of ethical conduct.
To the extent that prosecutors do adduce character evidence at capital trials
in order to assess future dangerousness, they run into potential constitutional
difficulties. The Court has repeatedly and recently applied a heightened
standard of review to capital sentencing schemes, holding that the imposition
of the death penalty cannot be "excessive. "2"6 To suggest that execution is the
least restrictive means of specific deterrence for anyone below an exceedingly
rarified stratum of impulsively violent people fails the laugh test. 5 7 Clearly
some value is at play beyond preventing future crimes by the convict.
B. The Constitutionalityof Character-BasedRetribution
Even if I have established that the retributive theories we rely upon in
sentencing individuals to death are personal, I have not established that they

254. See Janet Morrow & Robert Morrow, In a Narrow Grave: Texas PunishmentLaw in Capital
Murder Cases, 43 S. TEX. L. REv. 979, 984-85 (2002) (discussing Dickerson v. State, No.
71,920 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 4, 1996)).
255. Robert Weisberg, DeregulatingDeath, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305, 335. In his empirical study of

how capital jurors react to actual and potential aggravators and mitigators, Stephen Garvey
found that while factors relating to future dangerousness are highly aggravating, so too is
the defendant's lack of remorse. Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital
Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1538, 156o-61 (1998).
256. See infra text accompanying notes 288-293.

257. One controversial approach to incurably violent inmates has been confinement in supermax
prisons, which have been characterized as having "[dlynamics of domination, control,
subordination, and submission [that] are fundamentally different from those in regular
maximum security prisons." Leena Kurki & Norval Morris, The Purposes, Practices, and
Problems of Supermax Prisons, in 28 CRIME &JUST. 385, 390 (Michael Tonry ed., 2001). Little

empirical research has emerged on the effectiveness of supermax prisons at reducing
violence, but for one study's take, see Chad S. Briggs et al., The Effect of Supermaximum
Security Prisons on Aggregate Levels of Institutional Violence, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 1341 (2003),

which finds that supermaxes in Illinois, Arizona, and Minnesota could not be justified as a
means of increasing inmate safety, but finds mixed results as to staff safety. See also Richard
L. Lippke, Against Supermax, 21 J. APPLIED PHRL. 109, 113 (2004) (arguing that proponents

have not carried their burden of demonstrating that the benefits of supermax facilities
outweigh their enormous costs). The fact that states themselves are the typical proponents
of the argument that supermax prisons reduce violence should raise red flags as to the
appropriateness of the future dangerousness inquiry at its present level of generality.
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are personal in a constitutionally impermissible way. There are obvious
differences, to say the least, between convicted homosexual sodomists and
convicted murderers. A convincing view of Lawrence is that it simply recognizes
some social consensus that engaging in homosexual conduct does not violate a
public duty, whereas murder certainly does. This distinction conforms to the
moral intuitions of many, but is unsatisfying. I have argued that the only way
to understand Lawrence as a creature of the doctrinal tradition, rather than as a
sui generis determination that writing moral disapprobation of gays into
statutes is unconstitutional, is to recognize the principle that status-definitional
conduct is protected by substantive due process in a way that other conduct is
not. If we can identify status-definitional elements of other forms of a priori
criminal conduct, why should that conduct not also be constitutionally
protected against morals legislation?
Imagine the Texas legislature enacts the following amendment to its capital
murder statute:
Capital Murder Sodomy. A person commits an offense if the person
commits murder as defined under Section 19 .o2(b)(1) under the
following conditions:
the person commits the murder while committing sodomy against a
minor; and the person and the minor are of the same sex.
By punishing homosexual conduct more severely than like heterosexual
conduct, such a statute would pose obvious difficulties under Lawrence.2"8 Yet
Lawrence does not on its own terms furnish any grounds upon which to
distinguish gay people from "inwardly wicked" or otherwise morally
blameworthy people. Justice Kennedy expressly eschews "mandat[ing] [his]
own moral code."259 Yet many Americans believe that homosexuality reflects
deep character flaws, and moreover that these flaws are particularly likely to
manifest themselves as crimes of moral turpitude. If we are to take Justice

258.

259.

The Supreme Court suggested as much in Limon v.Kansas, in which the Court vacated and
remanded an opinion by the Kansas Court of Appeals upholding a Kansas statute that
punished homosexual sodomy of a minor more severely than its heterosexual counterpart.
539 U.S. 955 (2003); see infra text accompanying notes 317-322.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 85o (1992)).
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Kennedy's words seriously, they must mean that the Court should be, to
borrow from the First Amendment jurisprudence, content-neutral.26
If this is so, then the crucial question is: content-neutral with respect to
what? A tempting option is to say that the Court must be content-neutral
within the category of acts that individuals have the moral freedom to engage
in. One does not have a liberty right to engage in criminal conduct, but the
cases have not articulated a principle that excludes homosexual sodomy from
the family of criminal conduct. Without a theory of the instrumental value of
same-sex sexual relations, anti-sodomy laws are just another example of "laws
representing essentially moral choices. "26 1 The theory articulated in Lawrence, I
have argued, is that anti-sodomy laws breach the status-conduct divide by
punishing for who someone is rather than for what they do. And yet the
retributive rationale upon which our death penalty doctrine largely relies does
the same, for it attaches penological relevance to the substance of an
individual's constitutive commitments.
Lawrence is not our only jurisprudential paean to this kind of contentneutrality in punishment. The Court expressed a similar idea more than forty
years ago when it held in Robinson v. Californiathat punishing a "status" crime
violates the Eighth Amendment."' As Justice Douglas wrote in concurrence:
"[T] he principle that would deny power to exact capital punishment for a petty
crime would also deny power to punish a person by fine or imprisonment for
being sick. ",, 63 It will be objected that the morally depraved is "sick" not in the
medical but in the colloquial sense. Whereas sickness or addiction is simple bad
6
luck, a mentally competent person, even one with bad "constitutive" luck,2 4
commits a heinous murder as an act of will.26' Even without engaging the
determinist's response to this objection, it will suffice to note that Lawrence
does not, either explicitly or implicitly, rely on a judgment about whether the
status defined by the conduct was willful or not.
The illiberality of punishing someone for having a disfavored constitution
also finds expression in the Bill of Attainder clauses. Those clauses were meant

26o.

See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (requiring time, place, and manner
restrictions on speech in public forums to be content-neutral and to satisfy heightened
scrutiny analysis).

261.

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558

262.

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660

263.

Id. at 676 (Douglas, J., concurring).

(2003).

(1962).

264. Constitutive luck is that which inheres in the innate characteristics and abilities with which
life blesses (or curses) us. See THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 24,28 (1979).
265. See MOORE, supra note 231, at

217.
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to embody the idea that it is wrong for a criminal statute to "designate[]
criminals rather than crimes. ' ,26 6 Wrote Akhil Amar, "[b]oth legislation and
adjudication must be suitably impersonal. Neither legislators nor judges can
punish me simply because they do not like me. ",267 Neither, I argue, can they
enhance your sentence for that reason if Lawrence declares "we don't like you"
to be an ad hominem rather than a determinant of criminal liability. Amar
suggested that one's "intent and predispositions" may be relevant to
"punishment and deterrence" once a person "has violated a legitimate criminal
law. ,,268 Post-Lawrence, at least, I suggest that one's predispositions are relevant
only to the extent that they help the state to effectuate legitimate penological
objectives such as sentence length, correctional classification, and rehabilitative
regimen. To say, without more, that one must die because he is morally
depraved ignores the command of impersonality.

C. Responding to Objections
A number of difficulties remain for my argument. This Section responds to
five anticipated objections. First, after all my talk of "constitutional fit" and
"political responsibility, " 6 9 it may seem that I have suddenly abandoned all
prudential constraint and ignored a political tradition in sentencing that
already has gamely survived innumerable constitutional challenges. Second, it
may seem that I have glossed over the constitutional distinction between a
community's regulation of primary conduct and its choice of punishments.
Third, social consensus may not play the same role in criminal sentencing as it
plays in Lawrence. Fourth, my thesis may appear to require that belief in free
will be read out of the Constitution, which is inconsistent with any reasonable
concession to judicial restraint. Finally, the future of mitigation evidence under
my scheme is uncertain, if the state is to take seriously the mandate of contentneutrality. I address each objection in turn.
1. Hate Speech and the FirstAmendment

One might ask why a prudent judge ever would upset substantially settled
death penalty jurisprudence in service of a rather tottering and uncertain new
principle. One answer is to concede that a prudent judge would not do so. It is

266. Amar, supra note 62, at 211.
267.

Id. at 21o.

268. Id.

at 218.

269. See supra text accompanying notes 111-113.
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not the argument of this Article that judges should take Lawrence as an
opportunity to launch the metaprivacy revolution. Rather, this Article is a
provocation directed at judges and scholars, both to think in terms of principles
and to resist second-guessing the natural consequences of those principles. Its
claim is that the more one considers the particular slice of capital sentencing
doctrine that has been this Article's focus, the more one recognizes that it is not
metaprivacy, but viewpoint-discriminatory character evaluation that is the
doctrinal outlier.
The best example, perhaps, of metaprivacy's fit with constitutional
jurisprudence outside of the privacy cases is found in First Amendment
doctrine. Viewpoint discrimination remains paradigmatically repugnant to the
First Amendment.17 Within a public forum, the state may no more disfavor
criminal advocacy than gay rights advocacy, abortion rights advocacy, or black
power. 7' Even a Ku Klux Klan member shouting racist invective and agitating
for "revengeance" before a burning cross to a group of armed followers cannot
be convicted unless it can be shown that his advocacy not only "is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action," but also that such advocacy "is
likely to incite or produce such action. '2 7 If the character of the committed
murderer is precisely analogous to the words of the committed inciter, then a
character-based penalty phase inquiry not intended to adduce a likelihood of
imminent danger is inappropriate.
But the committed murderer is not analogous, at least not precisely. Our
First Amendment doctrine historically has attempted to distinguish, as it must,
between expressive speech and expressive conduct. Thus, in R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, the Court struck down as unconstitutionally overbroad and contentbased a St. Paul, Minnesota, ordinance that criminalized the display of a
"symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not
limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on

270.

271.

See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding
unconstitutional a public after-school program that prohibited a Christian group from using
school facilities); Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 583 (1998) (holding
that the statutory requirement that the National Endowment for the Arts take "decency and
respect" into consideration does not "engender the kind of directed viewpoint
discrimination that would prompt this Court to invalidate a statute on its face"); R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384 (1992) ("[T]he government may proscribe libel; but it
may not make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the
government.").
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

a7. Id. at 447.
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the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender." 273 While conceding for

decisional purposes that the statute was aimed at "fighting words," a category
of regulable speech, 74 the Court concluded that the ordinance was invalid
because it "applies only to 'fighting words' that insult, or provoke violence, 'on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.'

27

1

It was precisely because

fighting words constitute a category of regulable speech rather than a form of
communication "entirely invisible" to the First Amendment that the ordinance
was struck down.276
Contrast this approach with the Court's approach in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,
in which a unanimous Court upheld a Wisconsin statute that enhanced the
sentence of any criminal convict who intentionally selected his victim on
account of "race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin
or ancestry." ' 7 The defendant, who was black and had robbed and beaten a
white boy apparently selected because of his race, argued that the statute
"
impermissibly "punishes bigoted thought and not conduct. 127'
The Court

disagreed, arguing that the statute "is aimed at conduct unprotected by the
First Amendment." 79 The fact that the statute took motive into account made
it no different than Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 8 ° not to mention a host of
ordinary criminal statutes. Accounting for motive does not alter the conductbased nature of the statute's prohibitions. As in the antidiscrimination context,
the First Amendment is no defense to criminal conduct.
A robust speech-conduct distinction would provide a daunting obstacle,
grounded in doctrinal integrity, to any argument for a metaprivacy defense to a
character-based retributive death sentence. The distinction does not, however,
adequately explain the doctrine, for the First Amendment in fact provides a
defense to generally applicable laws regulating conduct, in the form of the right
to expressive association. s1 In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court upheld
the Boy Scouts' right to an exemption from New Jersey's public
accommodations laws on the ground that retaining an avowedly gay
scoutmaster "would significantly burden the organization's right to oppose or

273. 505 U.S. at 380 (quoting the ordinance).
274. See id. at 381.
275. Id. at 391 (quoting the ordinance).
276.

Id. at 383.

277. 5o8
278.

U.S. 476,48o (1993).

Id. at 483.

279. Id. at 487.
280. Id.

281.See Rubenfeld, supra note 228, at 1157-58.
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disfavor homosexual conduct. " s2 Such a burden could only be justified
through a searching strict scrutiny test satisfied only when enforcing the
statute "would not materially interfere with the ideas that the organization
sought to express."283 Dale seems to imply a new constitutional defense to Title
VII,284 unless its bona fide occupational qualification defense miraculously
dovetails with the newly thickened right to expressive association. If some
principle distinguishes R.A.V. and Mitchell under the post-Date constitutional
order, it would not appear to be speech versus conduct.
Lawrence as metaprivacy recommends a way out of this doctrinal confusion.
Like Dale, Lawrence allows an exemption from generally applicable and
otherwise constitutional laws that regulate conduct. And like Dale, the
exemption appears to be grounded not in a speech-conduct distinction but in
an incidental-definitional distinction.28 The Dale Court took pains to inquire
into the significance of the burden that allowing an openly gay scoutmaster
would have on the Boy Scouts' expressive rights. 6 A charitable reading of the
case is that heterosexual propaganda is an essential part of the organization's
message, and, therefore, that subjecting the organization to the state's
antidiscrimination laws would defeat its right to self-definition. A right to
expressive association may thus be recharacterized as a corporate right to
metaprivacy.
I do not wish to overemphasize the links between metaprivacy and the First
Amendment expressive association doctrine. My more modest objective has
been to demonstrate that an open-ended tolerance for the most deeply
unpopular of ethical commitments is consistent with the First Amendment,
and that the fact that convicted criminals have engaged in conduct rather than
speech does not defeat this consistency.

z82. 530 U.S. 640, 659
283.

(2000).

Id. at 657. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued in Dale that the Court was simply reaffirming a
right it had recognized in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,
Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995), which allowed the organizers of Boston's St. Patrick's Day Parade

to avert Massachusetts antidiscrimination laws to prevent a gay rights group from
marching. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653-54.
284. See David E. Bernstein, AntidiscriminationLaws and the FirstAmendment, 66 Mo. L. REv. 83,
125-32 (2001).

285. See supra text accompanying notes 82-89.
286. Dale, 530 U.S. at 65o-56.
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JudicialReview of Choice ofPunishment

Judicial review of legislative choices about the kinds of punishments to
employ looks different, of course, than judicial review of criminal statutes. My
argument must answer two important questions: first, whether the principles
governing judicial review of primary conduct apply neatly to review of
punishment decisions, and second, whether those principles extend equally to
all punishments. If the answer to the second question is yes, then my argument
would become unwieldy, as it would logically extend to the entire criminal
justice system.
In applying the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court maintains that it
owes legislatures deference in their choice of punishments, though the degree
of deference has wavered over time and among Justices. "[I]n assessing a
punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature against the
constitutional measure, we presume its validity," Justice Stewart wrote three
decades ago in Gregg v. Georgia. "We may not require the legislature to select
the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not cruelly
inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved. And a heavy burden rests
on those who would attack the judgment of the representatives of the
people. ",2s7 Outside the context of criminal punishment, whose jurisprudence
tends not to speak in such terms, Justice Stewart's Eighth Amendment
reviewing standard would be akin to a "rational basis" test. It does not require
narrow tailoring; it merely asks that the punishment not be cruel or unusual,
the punishment analog to "arbitrary" in the levels-of-scrutiny context.
Moreover, the test Justice Stewart articulated does not, on its face, prohibit
"excessive" punishment; such a prohibition would require that the legislature
select the least severe penalty possible.
The Court has since repudiated this reading, at least as applied to capital
cases. In the Court's most recent high-profile death penalty case, Roper v.
Simmons, Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority that "the Eighth Amendment
guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions. " "2s
A ban on "all excessive punishments "2s9 necessarily applies a heightened
standard of scrutiny, because it requires a heightened degree of proportionality
between the offense and the punishment. 9" It might well be argued that the

287.

Gregg v. Georgia,

428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976).

288. 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1190 (2005).

zSg. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 n.7 (2002).
290.

See id. at 311 ("[1]t is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to [the] offense." (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910))).

1914
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standard is akin to the "strict scrutiny" standard that attends race-based
governmental classifications.2 9 ' Indeed, the Court has required an individual
inquiry into the character of an offender before he is sentenced to death in
order to avoid "the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of
factors which may call for a less severe penalty."29 2 This inquiry into mitigating
factors is based on the judgment in Woodson v. North Carolinathat "the penalty
of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however
long."29' 3 Allowing that "death is different" has cloven the Court's review of
punishments into separate inquiries for ordinary imprisonment versus the
death penalty. In noncapital cases, the "heightened scrutiny" that prevents
excessive punishment is neutered, at best, to what Justice Kennedy has called a
"narrow proportionality principle."294
This distinction between the justiciability of the length of a prison term and
the mode of punishment checkers Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The first
case to consider the constitutionality of a criminal statute under the Eighth
Amendment was Weems v. United States, in which the Court invalidated a
Philippines statute that imposed a fifteen-year prison sentence, a $4,000 fine,
and costs for the crime of falsifying a public document. 9 The imprisonment in
Weems was itself atypically draconian, involving "a chain at the ankle and wrist
of the offender, "296 and, in the words of the statute itself, "hard and painful
labor [with] no assistance whatsoever from without the institution. "1 97 It is at
least arguable that the Weems Court was concerned more with the mode of
punishment than the length itself, particularly because it took pains to describe
the conditions of confinement in what it called "graphic" detail'9 8 Similarly, a

291.

See, e.g., The Supreme Court 1986 Term: Leading Cases-Death Penalty-Victim Impact
Statements, loi HARv. L. REv. 119, 168-69 (1987) (describing the Supreme Court's
application of strict scrutiny to capital punishments).

292.

Locket v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).

293. 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
294. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Ewing v.

California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy is the only member of
the current Court known to support a "narrow" proportionality rule for noncapital
sentences. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer would have a "broad and basic"
proportionality principle govern noncapital cases, see Ewing, 538 U.S. at 33-35 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), and Justices Scalia and Thomas would have none at all in such cases, see id. at 31
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
The views of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito remain unknown as of this writing.
295. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
296. Id. at 366.
297. Id. at 364.
298. Id. at 366.
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Court plurality declared in Trop v. Dulles, which overturned a statute that
stripped wartime deserters of their American citizenship,29 9 that "[flines,
imprisonment and even execution may be imposed depending upon the
enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the bounds of these
traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect."3"' The Court relied explicitly
on the length-mode distinction in Rummel v. Estelle, in which the Court upheld
a Texas recidivist statute. °1 Then-Justice Rehnquist wrote that, unlike
"unique" punishments such as the Weems statute and the death penalty, "the
length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative
prerogative."" 2 Therefore, for prudential reasons (at least),"' Eighth
Amendment doctrine limits my argument to capital punishment.
The Roper and Atkins Courts dutifully reiterated that the sine qua non of
judicial review for excessiveness under the Eighth Amendment is the "evolving
standards of decency" inquiry discussed in Subsection I.B.2.3 °4 Under the
doctrine in capital cases, the Court is to look first at "objective indicia of
consensus" that a punishment is disproportionate, and then "determine, in the
exercise of [its] own independent judgment" whether there is reason to
question the revealed consensus. °s This statement of the doctrine is

299.

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).

300. Id. at OO.
301. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (198o).
302.

Id. at 274.

303. A full account of the relationship between excessive punishment and metaprivacy would ask
whether this difference is salient because it is "constitutional" or because it is "prudential."
That is, does the Court's reluctance to engage in an excessiveness inquiry in noncapital cases
result from a determination that excessive prison sentences are unproblematic
constitutionally, or is it rather a matter of deference to legislative judgments, a recognition
that a court simply lacks the competence to determine whether a prison sentence is too long?
Justice Scalia's Harmelin opinion provides a useful articulation of the prudential argument
against constitutionalizing a proportionality principle in cases reviewing the lengths of
prison terms: "While there are relatively clear historical guidelines and accepted practices
that enable judges to determine which modes of punishment are 'cruel and unusual,'
proportionalitydoes not lend itself to such analysis." Harmelin v. Michigan, 5O1 U.S. 957, 985
(1991). The length of a prison term is a continuous variable, and so the difference between
one term and the next is not susceptible to controlled analysis that references agreed-upon
principles. But because "[t]he penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal
punishment, not in degree but in kind," Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972)

(Stewart, J., concurring), the legislative analysis that begets it is more amenable to judicial
scrutiny.
304. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1190 (2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100-01 (1958)); Atdins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002).
305. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192; see alsoAtkins,

1916

536 U.S. at 313-16.
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incomplete, however. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court unanimously
invalidated an Oklahoma statute that provided for the sterilization of those
thrice convicted of "crimes amounting to felonies involving moral
turpitude. ''3o6 The Skinner Court struck the statute down on equal protection
grounds because it drew what the Court regarded as arbitrary lines between
similarly situated classes of individuals, denying to one class "one of the basic
civil rights of man." 30 7 For example, Justice Douglas wrote for the majority: "A
person who enters a chicken coop and steals chickens commits a felony; and he
may be sterilized if he is thrice convicted. If, however, he is a bailee of the
property and fraudulently appropriates it, he is an embezzler [and therefore
exempt from sterilization] .,3o8 Skinner demonstrates, among other things, that
the Eighth Amendment is not the last word on the constitutionality of a
particular mode of criminal punishment. 9 Punishment statutes may well
implicate fundamental rights other than the right to life; when they do so,
those statutes are subject to heightened scrutiny. The answer to whether a
capital punishment regime is excessive, then, will be informed not only by
community consensus or (potentially) the subjective views of the Justices
themselves, but also must answer as well to the substantive rights protected
elsewhere in the Constitution.
This doctrinal qualifier, obvious perhaps but rarely stated, parallels the
Court's treatment of convicts serving ordinary prison sentences. Though not
always so historically, it is now axiomatic that "prisoners do not shed all
constitutional rights at the prison gate."" ' The Court has repudiated the view
that the fact of conviction grants to the state license to punish arbitrarily. The
Court has noted, for example, that the protections of the Free Exercise Clause,
the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause all apply to prisoners
as well as to the general population. 1 ' Current doctrine strongly implies that
the only extraconstitutional deprivations that may be visited upon prisoners are
those that "effectuate[] prison management and prisoner rehabilitative

306. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (internal quotation marks omitted).
307. Id. at 538-39, 541.

3o8. Id. at 539 (citation omitted). Of course, if he is an embezzler, he is also more likely to be
white.
309. In the post-Griswoldera, Skinner has been converted into a substantive due process case. See,
e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy,
and the Human Body, 8o B.U. L. REV. 359, 389 (2000)(describing Skinner as a privacy case).
310.

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995).

311.

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556

(1974);

see also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per

curiam) (applying the Free Exercise Clause to a Buddhist inmate).
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goals."31 2 The standard formulation requires that prison-imposed burdens on
most constitutional rights be "reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests. 31 3 Being convicted of a crime naturally diminishes the convict's
rights against the state, but it does so only incident to the necessities of
14
carrying out the initial sentence.
Relatedly, the Court has stressed that the broad inquiry into aggravating
and mitigating factors in the penalty phase of a capital trial cannot be so broad
as to threaten independent constitutional imperatives. A state may not, for
example, "characterize the display of a red flag, the expression of unpopular
political views, or the request for trial by jury as an aggravating
circumstance.""3 1 Neither may it "attach[] the 'aggravating' label to factors that
are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing
process, such as for example the race, religion, or political affiliation of the
defendant."' 6 The state's obligation to adhere to the limitations of metaprivacy
is no exception.
Limon v. Kansas is instructive in this regard. Limon concerned whether the
State of Kansas may punish homosexual sodomy of a minor more severely than
heterosexual sodomy."' The Kansas Court of Appeals initially held that the
discrepancy was permissible.~ The Kansas Supreme Court initially denied
review, but the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the decision,

312.

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485; see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555-56 ("There is no iron curtain drawn

between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.").
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The Apprendi line of cases also supports a broader
notion that the full range of punishment, and not merely the predicate of a given conviction,
is subject to the evidentiary cousin of "strict scrutiny," that is, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) ("Merely using the label
,sentencing enhancement' to describe [the additional time imposed for a racial motive]
surely does not provide a principled basis for treating [it] differently [from the underlying
offense]."). But cf.Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration:Why Is This Right Different
from All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 781, 816 (1994) (challenging the idea that the
reasonable doubt standard can be meaningfully substituted for strict scrutiny).
314. See Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1149 (2005) (noting that the Court has applied the
relaxed standard requiring that a constitutional deprivation in prison bear a reasonable
relationship to legitimate penological interests "only to rights that are inconsistent with
proper incarceration" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
315. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983) (citations omitted).
316. Id.
317. State v. Limon, 83 P. 3d 229 (Kan. Ct.App. 2004), rev'd, 122 P. 3 d 22, 35 (Kan. 2005).
318. State v. Limon, 41 P.3 d 303 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (mem.), vacated and remanded by 539 U.S.
955 (2oo3) (mem.).
313.
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and remanded in light of Lawrence.31 9 The Kansas Court of Appeals ruled on
remand that the differential is justifiable, 32 ° but the Kansas Supreme Court
reversed, holding that, per Lawrence and Romer, "moral disapproval of a group
cannot be a legitimate governmental interest."32 ' I have argued that where the
rubber meets the road in Lawrence is in the definition, for constitutional
purposes, of a "group." The take-home point of Limon is the recognitionexplicit in the opinion of the Kansas Supreme Court and implicit in the
Supreme Court's initial remand-that the principles of Lawrence, as with all
other independent constitutional principles, inform judicial review of a
sentencing enhancement no less than they do primary conduct."
3. Recognizing Recognition Redux
We have seen that social consensus plays a role in delineating the protected
interests in Lawrence, namely in identifying status-definitional conduct.323
There are at least two potential problems in extending this logic to other forms
of criminality. First, even if we accept the command of content-neutrality, it is
not obvious that the requisite determination has even been made in the
criminal sentencing context. Wrote Jed Rubenfeld:
When a person obeys the law against murder, or almost any other law,
his life is constrained but not usually informed or taken over to any
substantial degree with a set of new activities and concerns. He is not
thrust into a set of new institutions or relations. The category of "nonmurderer" is essentially a formal one; it is not a defined role or identity
with substantial, affirmative, institutionalized functions."
Criminals may actualize their autonomy through criminal behavior, or they
may not. Moreover, our evidence of such actualization -the character evidence
introduced at the sentencing phase of a trial -may not indicate the kind of
metacommitment thought relevant in Lawrence.

319. Limon v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 955 (2003) (mem.).

320. Limon, 83 P. 3d at 229.
321.

State v. Limon,

122 P. 3 d 22, 35 (Kan. 2005).

322. See id. at 28-29. Capital punishment is the ultimate sentencing enhancement, as it
"definitively eliminates the condemned man." ALBERT CAMUS, Reflections on the Guillotine
(1957), reprinted in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH 173, 210 (Justin O'Brien trans.,

Alfred A. Knopf 1961).
323.
324.

See supra text accompanying notes
Rubenfeld, supra note 202, at 793.
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This objection proves too much. Participating in homosexual sodomy does
not necessarily reflect an attempt at self-actualization either, and indeed Justice
Scalia was deeply skeptical of any distinction between homosexual sodomy and
nudism in their respective substantiations of self-defining conduct.32 The
question is whether having a moral character tied to criminal behavior is, from
the vantage point of social consensus, more like nudism or more like
homosexual sodomy. That is, does social consensus indicate that the criminal
behavior of, say, Todd Rizzo,326 is incidental to his being, or that it is
constitutive of it?
The inquiry has two parts: First, I must demonstrate that social consensus
is the instrument of decisionmaking. Then, I must show that the judgment
made by social consensus in the criminal sentencing context is like the
judgment referenced in Lawrence. The first issue is essentially answered by
stipulation. A statute listing moral blameworthiness, bad character, or history
as a sexual predator as aggravators is itself a powerful demonstration of social
consensus. The legislative designation of character-linked sentencing factors
indicates to the jury a community's devaluation of a particular status. When,
relying on such aggravators, the jury designates as death-eligible someone who
has committed an act, it is declaring, in effect, that the act is an inexorable
manifestation of the disfavored status.32 7 Furman's command of individualized
capital sentencing merely decentralizes social consensus, forcing the legislature
to delegate to the jury its authority as the principal instrument of that
consensus.
The answer to the second issue-whether these two facially distinct
manifestations of social consensus are truly analogous -is more difficult. For
assistance, I turn to the Supreme Court case of Dawson v. Delaware."8 in
Dawson, the State of Delaware sought to rebut mitigating "good" character
evidence of the defendant's kindness and prison good time credits with "bad"
character evidence that Dawson belonged to an avowedly racist gang, the
Aryan Brotherhood. 2 9 The Court refused to allow the evidence on the ground
that the First Amendment prevents a state from "employing evidence of a
defendant's abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no
bearing on the issue being tried."33 Belonging to a racist gang might indicate

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 6oi (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
326. See supra text accompanying note 2.
327. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1195 (2005).
325.

328. 503 U.S. 159 (1992).
329.

Id. at 167-68.

330. Id. at 168.
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"bad" moral character, but only the fact that the evidence was not
demonstrably relevant to Dawson's criminal tendencies prevented it from
being used.33 ' A jury weighing aggravating factors is not asked to judge
whether a convict might happen to be a bad person incidental to being a
criminal, but rather whether he is a criminally bad person, one whose moral
commitments tend-nay, hurdle-toward the criminal activity for which he
has been convicted. The judgment being made is whether criminal activity is a
manifestation of a deeper identity. Withholding an enhanced punishment but
for the presence of this identity is inconsistent with Lawrence, just as
withholding enhanced punishment but for the presence of abstract beliefs and
political affiliations is inconsistent with First Amendment doctrine.
4. On Free Will
If this Article's argument requires that the state reject free will and adopt a
determinist position on human agency, that may be sufficient reason to reject
it. One explanation for the principle of content-neutrality that this Article has
sketched would be that someone with a criminal constitution cannot be held
responsible for his criminal actions. On this view, Lawrence rests on the idea
that gay identity is not freely chosen, and therefore the conduct associated with
gay identity should not be criminalized. If one also cannot choose not to be a
committed criminal, it would follow that punishing on this basis is also
impermissible. Imputing to the Constitution so controversial a philosophical
view would be so aggressively radical - activist, I dare say - that we would have
to reject it on its face.
A determinist explanation is not the only one, however. An alternative
position is an epistemological one: Even if criminals are exercising their free
will in committing crimes, how is one ever to know? Evidence of inherent bad
character may demonstrate a decreased likelihood that a bad act is freely
chosen. A third position is that Lawrence-style metaprivacy does not accept any
determinist account, but simply requires that the state take no position, as
retributive punishment might,332 on whether people with criminal character are
exercising free will in committing crimes. Finally, Lawrence may have nothing
whatsoever to do with free will, and may just be a case about the appropriate

331.See id. at 167 ("Delaware might have avoided this problem if it had presented evidence
showing more than mere abstract beliefs on Dawson's part, but on the present record one is
left with the feeling that the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was employed simply because the
jury would find these beliefs morally reprehensible.").
332. But see NOZICK, supra note 233, at 393 (arguing that a belief in determinism is not
inconsistent with retributive punishment).
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limits of the state's power to judge identities. This list does not exhaust the
possibilities, but it makes the point, namely that my argument makes no
necessary assumption about the constitutional legitimacy of the state's
assumptions regarding free will.
5. On Mitigation
If this Article's claim is correct, and the state must indeed be contentneutral, does it mean that, contrary to Lockett v. Ohio,333 a capital jury no longer
may hear evidence at the penalty phase that, say, church attendance, random
acts of kindness, or a generally pacific nature demonstrate that a defendant
deserves to live? One might be tempted reflexively to say no, on the ground
that Lawrence is about making only pejorative moral judgments about
constitutive character. Because mitigation evidence is not used as a form of
punishment, it falls outside the scope of the principles of metaprivacy. But any
time the state decreases a punishment based on mitigating evidence, it
necessarily creates a differential between people who possess the trait in
evidence and those who do not. Those convicts for whom mitigation evidence
is unavailing are executed, though the presence of sufficient mitigating
character evidence would have spared them. Content-neutral this is not.
The position this Article takes, then, as it must, is that mitigating evidence
is equally capable of violating the principles of Lawrence. When such evidence
is adduced to vindicate a belief that certain personal metacommitments are
deontologically more worthy of enhanced punishment than others, it must be
excluded. Indeed, mitigation is arguably the dominant situs for the injection of
character judgments into capital sentencing. In a practical sense, this means
that in order to enforce faithfully a no-character-judgment capital punishment
regime, one would have to police the use of mitigators, and thereby limit
Lockett severely. Applying metaprivacy to capital punishment would, in other
words, put to the public a choice between, on one hand, more executions of
those who would otherwise be saved by a jury's approval of their character, and
on the other hand, fewer executions generally, of the favored and disfavored
alike. I do not know which of these options Americans would choose. But
punting a transparent and difficult political choice to legislatures (free of
unconstitutional bias) is the end, not the beginning, of judicial review. The
tendency of judicial condemnation of certain pejorative character judgments to

333. 438 U.S. 586 (1978)

(plurality opinion).
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undermine the introduction of mitigation evidence is therefore a political, not
34
an analytical, objection to this Article's claim.1
D. The Normative Question
I want to emphasize, finally, that mine is a lawyer's argument, not a
philosopher's. The doctrine may have an implicit answer to the open-ended
conception of metaprivacy that this Article has sketched. There is, after all, an
immense literature on the line of demarcation between legitimate and
illegitimate normativity. Although here is not the place for a theoretical
discussion on the range of acceptable ethical views, it may be useful to consider
at least one defensible distinction, if only to provide a template for an
alternative conception. We might, for example, define an ethical view as a
fundamental moral claim that has an answer to what Christine Korsgaard calls
"the normative question. 1111 On this view, though it may be definitionally
necessary that ethical claims "issue in a deep way from our sense of who we

334. Even if metaprivacy-like principles were to prohibit a particular form of retributive
punishment, as outlined above, the constitutionality of capital punishment generally would
remain an open question. The Supreme Court reiterated recently that the Constitution
"does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory," Ewing v. California, 538 U.S.
11, 25 (2003) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 5O' U.S. 597, 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring)),

though the Court has cited only deterrence and retribution as acceptable rationales for
capital punishment. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. n183, 1196 (2005). It will be fruitful to
examine whether the death penalty can withstand scrutiny under wholly nonretributive
rationales for punishment, but that inquiry is beyond the scope of this Article. It may be
useful to ask, for example, what deference is owed to any legislative evidence supporting a
general deterrence rationale, especially in light of the Court's recent interest in scrutinizing
legislative factfinding in federalism cases. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee & Robert A.
Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REv. 87 (2001) (discussing Bd. of Trs. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)). Virtually all

will agree that the empirical debate is inconclusive at best. See Michael L. Radelet & Ronald
L. Akers, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The Views of the Experts, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 8 (1996) (finding that approximately eighty percent of criminologists

believe that, according to present literature, the death penalty has no significant deterrent
effect). But see Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does Capital Punishment Have a DeterrentEffect?
New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 344, 369 (2003)

(suggesting that each execution may save eighteen lives on average). At a higher level of
generality, it may be necessary to consider the extent to which general deterrence itself
represents a competing moral claim that cannot trump an individual's right to metaprivacy.
335. Christine Korsgaard, The Normative Question, in THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 7, 9-10
(Onora O'Neill ed., 1996).
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are,",, 6 it is not sufficient. An ethical view must be more than simply held; it
must be justified.
Korsgaard's four-part taxonomy of modem answers to the normative
question will be helpful in illustrating what is meant by an ethical view. She
divides theories of the sources of our ethical obligations into voluntarism,
realism, reflective endorsement, and the appeal to autonomy.33 7 Whereas the
voluntarist justifies normativity by its origin in superior authority;,, 8 the realist
does so through the irreducible fact of the existence of obligations;339 and the
proponents of reflective endorsement and the appeal to autonomy through
forms of self-conscious introspection. 4 ° All of the above accounts share an
obvious and important feature. Though Hobbes and Kant, say, differed
dramatically as to their views on the source of our obligations toward others -

336.
337.
338.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 18-19.
See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 124 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press rev.
student ed. 1996) (1651) ("It is true that they that have Soveraigne power, may commit
Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury in the proper signification."); SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF
THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 17 (Basil Kennett trans.,

4

th ed. 1729) ("For, since

Honesty (or moral Necessity) and Turpitude are Affections of human Deeds, arising from
their Agreeableness or Disagreeableness to a Rule, or a Law; and since a Law is the
Command of a Superior, it does not appear how we can conceive any Goodness or
Turpitude before all Law, and without the Imposition of a Superior.").
339. Wrote Thomas Nagel, illustrating the Occam's razor-like quality of realist argumentation:
If I have a severe headache, the headache seems to me to be not merely
unpleasant, but a bad thing. Not only do I dislike it, but I think I have a reason to
try to get rid of it. It is barely conceivable that this might be an illusion, but if the
idea of a bad thing makes sense at all, it need not be an illusion, and the true
explanation of my impression may be the simplest one, namely that headaches are
bad, and not just unwelcome to the people who have them.
THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 145-46 (1986); see also H. A. PRICHARD, Does
Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?, in MORAL OBLIGATION: ESSAYS AND LECTURES 1, 7

(1949) ("The sense of obligation to do, or of the rightness of, an action of a particular kind is
absolutely underivative or immediate."); W. D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 40 (1930)

340.

("[W]hat we are apt to describe as 'what we think' about moral questions contains a
considerable amount that we do not think but know, and. . . this forms the standard by
reference to which the truth of any moral theory has to be tested ... ").
See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 65 (Lewis White
Beck trans., 1959) (1785) ("What else, then, can freedom of the will be but autonomy, i.e.,
the property of the will to be a law to itself?"); JOHN RWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971)

(suggesting that the principles ofjustice be determined by "[t]he choice which rational men
would make in [a] hypothetical situation of equal liberty"); BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS
AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 117 (1985) ("[C]ritical reflection should seek for as much

shared understanding as it can find on any issue, and use any ethical material that, in the
context of the reflective discussion, makes some sense and commands some loyalty.").
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one thought it extrinsic, the other quite the opposite -both allowed that we
have them.
Now consider the claims of gays versus those of committed murderers. The
first thing to recognize is that both are underdetermined as ethical claims.
Neither the fact that an individual wishes to engage in sodomy nor the fact that
one wishes to murder tells us much about the individual's answer to the
normative question. One may argue, however, that there is a difference in that
the claim of the committed homosexual is not inconsistent with an ethical
view, while the claim of the committed murderer is. We might characterize the
depravity inquiry at the penalty phase as, in effect, an effort to determine
whether the convict considers himself to have obligations toward others. As
Canadian psychologist Robert Hare said, "[T] here are some people for whom
evil acts-what we would consider evil acts-are no big deal."3 41 It is not
implausible to believe that an individual who can be so characterized has not
satisfied the threshold of an ethical claim-that he accord some minimal level
of moral respect to the claims of others-and therefore is not entitled to have
his views respected. On this view, the committed murderer does not make a
debatable claim, but rather makes none at all. Such an individual is to conduct
as the obscene is to speech: "of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality." 2 Does not a similar distinction in the realm of
conduct better comport, if not with the express language of constitutional
doctrine, then at least with the theoretical assumptions of American law?
Perhaps. But it is for the doctrine, not for me, to so declare. The ethical
theories just mentioned are subtle and difficult. I discuss above what doctrine
asks of its principles ;34 navigating these subtleties is what principles ask of the
doctrine that sustains them. No case has yet declared that the inquiry into
character at the penalty phase of a capital trial is designed to adduce, and
properly so, whether the defendant's ethical views are consistent with the
collective reflective equilibrium of mankind. On the face of things, it seems
rather that society simply thinks it better that individuals with uncommonly
and demonstrably vile character be dead than be alive. The doctrine must tell
us why a legislative determination to give effect to this desire is sufficient for
some conduct but not other conduct.
It is possible, alas, that gays are in fact constitutionally sui generis, that
they are simply the rare class of individuals granted the autonomy to engage in

341.
342.

See Carey, supra note 7.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,

572 (1942).

343. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
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conduct prohibited by otherwise constitutional laws. For the Court to so
declare would, however, require the political courage to declare common law
constitutionalism a fraud and the deep sense of irony to announce that gays
share their constitutional singularity with the Boy Scouts of America.
CONCLUSION

An eighteenth-century Englishman could have been hanged for "[s]tealing
property worth a shilling or more, setting fire to a heap of hay, breaking down
the head of a fish pond so that the fish might escape, defacing Westminster
Bridge [or] cutting a hop-bind in a hop plantation."3 4 There are at least three
reasons for this apparent brutality. First, prisons were far less developed then
than now, and so capital punishment had fewer rivals.34 Second, the death
penalty was used far less than it was authorized to be used: "[Flor most
offences, capital punishment was there primarily to serve as a deterrent and...
only a limited number of executions were necessary to bring this point home to
the public."1 6 When alternatives to capital punishment are limited, that is, it is
sensible to make all crimes capital but only punish a few criminals. James
Whitman has highlighted a third reason for the high number of capital crimes,
but his is timeless: "Punishment," he noted, "puts people in their place.'34'
Whitman's (anthropological) claim is that "degradation in punishment is, and
48
always has been, closely related to traditions and practices of social status."1
On this view, punishment acts as a means of asserting social superiority.
Accepting Whitman's thesis makes it easy to see that prisoners and
identity-based social movements share a common foe: the libidinal need to
assert one's own moral superiority. The more we recognize this tendency, the
more we must take care that law exercise its ordered violence to protect us and
not to sate us. Robert Cover reminded us that the "deliberate infliction of pain
in order to destroy the victim's normative world and capacity to create shared
realities we call torture" 349 as well as law. H.L.A. Hart reminded us, in this
regard, that the Nazis believed that "anything is punishable if it is deserving of
punishment according to the fundamental conceptions of a penal law and

344. JOHN BRIGGS ET AL., CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ENGLAND: AN INTRODUCTORY HISTORY

(1996).
345. See id.at 82.
346.

Id. at 76.

347. WHITMAN,
348.

supra note 230,

at 22.

Id. at 26.

349. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 16oi, 1603 (1986).
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sound popular feeling.""' The impulses to degrade Jews, gays, and prisoners,
though obviously distinct in their particulars, are all influenced, heavily
perhaps, by an inherent human desire to engage in (small-c) constitutional
discrimination. Exorcising the fruits of this desire from law, as Mill and
Brandeis recognized, is the great challenge of liberalism. Lawrence is a salvo in
that struggle.
I have argued in this Article that Lawrence's doctrinal contribution is to
constitutionalize official neutrality between substantive metacommitments,
whether those commitments are to "gayness" or to a "depraved consciousness."
Many will say these are one and the same and have seen fit to legislate to that
end. We can deploy the law's coercion as a response to antisocial conduct, of
course, but to punish for dangerous character threatens to confuse normativity
with homogeneity. I have not argued that the death penalty is per se
unconstitutional. Neither have I argued that Lawrence was correctly reasoned
or even correctly decided. Had the case been decided on equal protection
grounds, for example, this Article could not have been written. Part of my
project, then, is to demonstrate the logical consequences of speaking in broad
terms of an identity group to whom one is not prepared to extend the respect
of heightened scrutiny.
A footnote is in order before I conclude. By taking seriously the language
Justice Kennedy used in Lawrence, this Article engages in a self-conscious act of
what Roberto Mangabeira Unger has termed, with considerable distress,
"rationalizing legal analysis.""' Rationalizing legal analysis is the translation of
"[1] aw prospectively made as the product of conflicting wills and imaginations,
interests and ideals," into "law retrospectively represented as the expression of
connected policies and principles."3 ' It is turning one's head at jurisprudence
as sociopolitical compromise and pretending that it is grounded in reason. A
convincing realist reading of Lawrence is plainly available. Lawrence appears to
be but the most high-profile installment in a politically inspired jurisprudence
of homosexuality that arose in the years following Bowers.3" 3 But this Article is
less interested in what the Justices were doing than in what they were saying.
Cases such as Romer, Lawrence, and Limon could be limited to their facts, but

they would not then qualify as jurisprudence under our doctrinal fictions. I am

35o. HART, supra note 30,

at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted).

351. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 36 (1996).

352. Id. at 69.
353. Whatever its rhetoric, Romer could be viewed as doing for gays what City of Cleburne v.

Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), did for the mentally retarded: It extended to
them the courtesy of heightened scrutiny without quite saying so.
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less interested in dictating a conclusion as to the meanings of these cases or the
scope of their prospective applications than I am in broadening the terms of
doctrinal debate by challenging the Court to articulate a nonarbitrary reason
why particular a priori criminal conduct- sodomy- receives unique judicial
protection. If the reader and I end this conversation disagreeing only on the
proper place of legal formalism in American constitutional discourse, then I
consider it a victory for the argument.
This Article, then, is an incitement, not a conclusion. It raises a number of
difficult questions worthy of far more extensive treatment than a work of
manageable scope can provide. I hope, at the very least, to have persuaded the
reader that when we look past the political context in which Lawrence was
written and pause to reorient its "historical mess,"35 4 we recognize a tension.
Our jurisprudence is both notionally committed not to punish disfavored
status and fundamentally committed- both in practice and in theory- not just
to personal responsibility but also to personal blame, stubbornly insisting on
the legal relevance of the content of one's character. The tension thus
identified, the next move is the Court's.

3s4.

See

UNGER,

supra note 351, at 68 ("The voice of reason must speak, although belatedly, in

history, redescribing and reorienting the historical mess.").
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